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Runtime monitoring is an established technique to enforce a wide range of program safety
and security properties. We present a formalization of monitoring and monitor inlining,
for the Java Virtual Machine. Monitors are security automata given in a special-purpose
monitor speciﬁcation language, ConSpec. The automata operate on ﬁnite or inﬁnite strings
of calls to a ﬁxed API, allowing local dependencies on parameter values and heap content.
We use a two-level class ﬁle annotation scheme to characterize two key properties: (i) that
the program is correct with respect to the monitor as a constraint on allowed program
behavior, and (ii) that the programhas a copy of the givenmonitor embedded into it. As the
main application of these results we sketch a simple inlining algorithm and show how the
two-level annotations canbecompleted toproducea fully annotatedprogramwhich is valid
in the standard sense of Floyd/Hoare logic. This establishes the mediation property that
inlined programs are guaranteed to adhere to the intended policy. Furthermore, validity
can be checked efﬁciently using a weakest precondition based annotation checker, thus
preparing the ground for on-device checking of policy adherence in a proof-carrying code
setting.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Programmonitoring is a ﬁrmly established and efﬁcient approach to enforce a wide range of program security and safety
properties [27,18,14,16,24,26,30,29,23]. Several approaches to program monitoring have been proposed in the literature. In
“explicit” monitoring, target program actions are intercepted and tested by some external monitoring agent [27,24,26]. A
variant, examined by Schneider and Erlingsson [17], is monitor inlining, where target programs are rewritten to include the
desired monitor functionality, thus making programs essentially self-monitoring [18,17,16,9]. This eliminates the need for
a runtime enforcement infrastructure which may be costly on small devices. Also, it opens the possibility for third party
developers to use inlining as a way of providing runtime guarantees to device users or their proxies. This, however, requires
that users are able to trust that inlining has been performed correctly.
In thiswork,we prepare the ground for the certiﬁcation of correctly inlined programs in a proof-carrying code framework.
To this end, we develop a suitable notion of proof to facilitate automatic proof generation and efﬁcient proof checking. By
correctness, we mean here the mediation property, namely that inlined programs are guaranteed to adhere to the intended
policy.
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Fig. 1. Level I annotated method.
Fig. 2. Level II annotated method.
We propose a formalization of monitoring and monitor inlining where monitors are security automata that operate on
calls to some ﬁxed API from a target program given as an abstract Java VirtualMachine (JVM) class ﬁle. Automaton transitions
are allowed to depend locally on argument values, heap at time of call and (normal or exceptional) return, and return value.
In order to handle a large class of inlined programs, we do not ﬁx the inlining procedure. Instead, we use annotations to
characterize self-monitoring programs, which would include any correctly inlined program.
Our main contributions are characterizations, in terms of JVM class ﬁles annotated by formulae in a suitable Floyd-like
program logic, of the following two conditions on a program relative to a given policy:
(1) that the program is policy-adherent; and the stronger condition
(2) that the program contains a method-local monitor for the policy.
By method-local we mean that the updates to the monitor state do not cross the boundaries of the caller method.
We achieve this using a two-level annotation scheme. In level I annotations, illustrated in Fig. 1, we specify a correct
monitor for the given policy in the program by means of “ghost” variables. The monitor state represented by these vari-
ables, which we call the ghost state (−→gs ), is updated before or after security relevant actions according to the transition
function δ of the security automaton. In the example program, such an update is shown for the action ac.m, which is
the call to method c.m. Transitions that violate the policy result in the ghost state becoming “undeﬁned”, indicating an
illegal monitor state. Level I annonations assert the ghost state to be a legal monitor state whenever a security relevant
action is to be executed and are therefore validated only by policy adherent programs, thus establishing the ﬁrst condition
above. In level II, we extend level I annotations to state at all method boundaries that the inlined monitor (represented by
global program variables) is “in sync” with the speciﬁed monitor (represented by the ghost variables). We show these
extended annotations in Fig. 2, where −→ms is used for the vector of global variables that represent the inlined monitor
state.
The method-local nature of the embedded monitor enables compositional analysis: validity can be checked per method.
Being method-local is not an overly restrictive condition on embedded monitors and is satisﬁed by all general purpose
inliners we know of.
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The annotations serve as an important intermediate step towards a decidable annotation validity problem, once the
inliner is suitably instantiated. By the above characterizations, the problem of showing correct monitor inlining reduces to
proving the validity of the corresponding annotations. For practical monitors, this is not a difﬁcult task. We illustrate this
by describing a monitor inlining scheme for which we prove the mediation property. We establish this by describing, for
programs inlined by the scheme, how the annotations can be completed to produce a fully annotated program. The resulting
veriﬁcation conditions are valid, thus showing that the inlined programs contain a correct method-local monitor for the
intended policy and henceforth policy-adherent. Furthermore, validity can be efﬁciently decided for these annotations using
a bytecode weakest precondition checker thus making them suitable to be used in a proof-carrying code setting to certify
monitor compliance to a third party such as a mobile device.
Our results can be seen as providing theoretical underpinnings for the earlier work by Schneider and Erlingsson [16].
The PoET/PSLang framework developed by Erlingsson represents monitors as Java snippets connected by an automaton
superstructure. The code snippets are inserted into target programs at suitable points to implement the inlined monitor
functionality. This approach, however, makes many monitor-related problems such as policy matching and adherence
undecidable. To overcome this, we base our results on a restricted monitor speciﬁcation language, ConSpec [2].
Organization. The document is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the JVMmodel used in this paper. Sections 3 and
4 introduce the automaton model in concrete and symbolic forms, the ConSpec language, and relations between the three.
Section 5 gives an account of monitoring by interleaved (co-) execution of a target program with a monitor, and establishes
the equivalence of policy adherence and co-execution. In Section 6, the two annotation levels are presented, and the main
characterization theorems are proved. In Section 7 the inliner is described and its correctness characterized. We also sketch
how to produce, for this inliner, fully annotated programs with a decidable validity problem. Section 8 summarizes related
work, discussing other monitor inliners, methods for specifying policy adherence and several security frameworks based on
proof-carrying code. Finally, in Section 9 we conclude and discuss future work.
2. Programmodel
We assume the reader to be familiar with Java bytecode syntax, the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), and formalizations of the
JVM such as [20]). Here we only present components of the JVM that are essential for the deﬁnitions in the rest of the text.
2.1. Types and values
We denote bytecode programs with T. We ﬁx a set of class names c ∈ C, a set of method namesm ∈ M, and a set of ﬁeld
names f ∈ F. Primitive type set PrimType consist of the types int and string. The type Void is used for methods that do not
return a value. A type τ ∈ Type is either a primitive type, a class c, the type Void or the type Null. We let γ ∈ (Type)* range
over tuples of types.
Each type τ ∈ Type determines a set ‖τ‖ of values. Val denotes the set of all values. Values of types int and string are
integers and strings, respectively, and make up the values of type PrimType, which are called the primitive values PrimVal.
The sets determined by the types Void and Null are singletons consisting of the values void and null, respectively.
Values of object type are (typed) locations  ∈ Loc, mapped to objects by a heap h ∈ H = Loc ⇀ O. The partial function
type : (,h) → C returns the type of location  in heap h, if  ∈ Dom(h), and is otherwise undeﬁned (i.e. ⊥). The structure
of objects in O is not further speciﬁed here. It sufﬁces to assume that if h :  → o ∈ O then h() determines a ﬁeld h().f
whenever the class which this object is a member of, declares f .
We also introduce a static heap sh : C × F ⇀ Val that stores the values of the static variables of a class. We assume shT0 to
be the initial mapping which maps each static variable of a class reachable through the program T to its initial value as given
by its class deﬁnition. In this sense, wemake two assumptions: the static variables of all reachable classes are assumed to be
initialized to constant values (i.e. we disregard static initializers) and the initialization is assumed to have been done before
the program starts executing. The ﬁrst assumption can be dropped by extending our approach to handle static initializers,
which is straightforward to perform.
Each class determines a set of ﬁelds and methods deﬁned for that type through its declaration. The class declarations
induce a hierarchy given by the subclassing partial preorder <: on the set {Null} ∪C. We write c1 <: c2 if c1 is a subclass of
(extends) c2. Null is the bottom element with respect to this ordering: ∀τ ∈ {Null} ∪C. Null <: τ . If c deﬁnesm (declares f )
explicitly, then c deﬁnes (declares) c.m (c.f ). We say that c deﬁnes c′.m (declares c′.f ) if c is the smallest superclass of c′ that
contains an explicit deﬁnition (declaration) of c.m (c.f ). Single inheritance ensures that deﬁnitions/declarations are unique,
if they exist.
2.2. Methods
Methoddeﬁnitionsaremodeled throughanenvironment takingmethodreferences to theirdeﬁnitions. Theenvironment
 is elidedwherepossible.Weassume furthermoreapartitioningon thesetofmethodswhichdivides the set intoAPImethods
and application methods. To simplify notation, method overloading is not considered, so a method is uniquely identiﬁed by
a method reference of the form M = (c,m). For a method (c.m), (c.m) : γ → τ when γ is the list of argument types and τ is
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the return type of the method. A method deﬁnition is a pair (P,H) consisting of a method body P and an exception handler
array H. The method body (the exception handler array) ofM is denoted PM (HM) when the environment  is clear from the
context. For each program, we assume that there exists a main method which does not have a class deﬁning it. We identify
this method with the special reference 〈main〉.
A method body P is a partial function from ω to the set of instructions such that ADDRP = Dom(P) has the form {1, . . . ,n}
for some n ∈ ω. We use the notation M[L] = I to indicate that (M) = (P,H) and P(L) is deﬁned and equal to the instruction
I. The exception handler array H is a partial map from integer indices to exception handlers. An exception handler (b, e, t, c)
catches exceptions of type c and its subtypes raised by instructions in the range [b, e) and transfers control to address t, if it
is the topmost handler that covers the instruction for this exception type.
Machine conﬁgurations. A conﬁguration of the JVM is a pair C = (R,h) of a stack R of activation records and a heap h. For normal
execution, the activation record at the top of the execution stack has the shape (M, pc, s, f ), where
• M is the currently executing method.
• The program counter pc is an index into the currently executing instruction array, i.e. it is a member of Dom(P) where
P is the body of M. The conﬁguration C is calling, if P(pc) is an invoke instruction, and it is returning normally, if P(pc)
is a return instruction.
• The operand stack s is the stack of values (i.e. primitive values or locations) currently being operated on.
• The local variables lv is a mapping of variables to values, preserving types.
For exceptional conﬁgurations C the top frame has the form (b)e where b is the location of an exceptional object. For
exceptional conﬁgurations, the current program counter and executing method is given by the frame below the exceptional
frame. Then, C is returning exceptionally if there is no handler for this exception and the current instruction label in the
currently executing method. Conﬁguration C is returning if C is either returning normally or exceptionally. Finally, if C is
exceptional and there is a single frame in the activation record, then the program is exiting exceptionally.
Machine transitions. We assume a transition relation −→JVM on JVM conﬁgurations. Such an operational semantics can be
found for instance in [20]. An execution E of a program (class ﬁle) P is then a (possibly inﬁnite) sequence of JVM conﬁgurations
C1C2C3 . . . where C1 is an initial conﬁguration consisting of a single, normal activation record with an empty stack, no local
variables, M as a reference to the main method of P, pc = 1,  set up according to P, and for each i ≥ 1, Ci −→JVM Ci+1. We
restrict attention to conﬁgurations that are type safe, in the sense that heap contents match the types of corresponding
locations, and that arguments and return/exceptional values for primitive operations as well as method invocations match
their prescribed types. The Java bytecode veriﬁer serves, among other things, to ensure that type safety is preserved under
machine transitions (cf. [28]).
API method calls. The only non-standard aspect of −→JVM is the treatment of API methods. We assume a ﬁxed API for which
we have access only to the signature, but not the implementation, of its methods. We therefore treat API method calls as
atomic instructionswith a non-deterministic semantics. This is similar to the approach taken, e.g., in [33]. In this sense,we do
not practice complete mediation [34].When an APImethod is called either the pc is incremented and arguments popped from
the operation stack and replaced by an arbitrary return value of appropriate type, or else an arbitrary exceptional activation
record is returned. Similarly, the return conﬁgurations for API method invocations contain an arbitrary heap, since we do
not know how API method bodies change heap contents.
Our approach hinges on our ability to recognize such method calls. This property is destroyed by the reﬂect API, which
is left out of consideration. Among the method invocation instructions, we discuss here only invokevirtual; the remaining
invoke instructions are treated similarly.
3. Security policies and automata
Let T be a program forwhichwe identify a set of security relevant actions A. Each execution of T determines a corresponding
set 	(T) ⊆ A*∪ Aω of ﬁnite or inﬁnite traces of actions in A. A security policy is a predicate on such traces, and T satisﬁes a
policy P if P(	(T)).
The notion of security automata was introduced by Schneider [35]. Here, we view a security automaton over alphabet A as
a deterministic automatonA = (Q , δ, q0)whereQ is a countable set of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and δ : Q × A ⇀ Q is a
(partial) transition function. All q ∈ Q are viewed as accepting. A security automatonA induces a security policyPA ⊆ 2A*∪Aω
through its language LA by PA(X) ⇔ X ⊆ LA.
In this study, we focus on security automata which are induced by policies in the ConSpec language (see Section 4) and
therefore are named ConSpec automata. The security relevant actions are method calls, represented by the class name and
the method name of the method, along with a sequence of values that represent the actual arguments. We partition the
set of security relevant actions into pre-actions A
 ⊆ C×M× Val*×H and post-actions A ⊆ RVal ×C×M× Val*×H×H,
corresponding to method invocations and returns. Both types of actions may refer to the heap prior to method invocation,
while the latter may also refer to the heap upon termination and to a return value from RVal = Val ∪ {exc} where exc is
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Fig. 3. Example policy in ConSpec.
used to mark exceptional return from a method call.1 The partitioning on security relevant actions induces a corresponding
partitioning on the transition function δ of ConSpec automata.
4. ConSpec: a contract speciﬁcation language
In this section, we introduce the policy speciﬁcation language ConSpec [2]. ConSpec is strongly inspired by PSLang, which
was developed by Erlingsson and Schneider [15] for runtime monitoring. However, ConSpec is more restricted: a guarded-
command language is used for the updates where the guards are side-effect free and commands do not contain loops.
This was a design choice taken to allow formal treatment of monitoring. In particular, the update function induced by the
guarded-commands should be effectively recreated by a weakest precondition propagation on inlined code compiled from
these commands. For reasons that will become clear later in the text, this property leads to a decidable problem of correct
inlining.
As an extension to PSLang, ConSpec supports expressing security requirements ondifferent levels, likemultiple executions
of the sameapplication, andon theexecutionsof all applicationsof a system,besides requirementsonall objectsof aparticular
class and on single executions of an application, which can be expressed by PSLang. In this work, we focus on policies on a
single execution of an application, however.
ConSpec Policy Example Assume method Open of class File is used for creating ﬁles (when argument mode has value
“CreateNew") or for opening ﬁles (mode is “Open"), either for reading (argument access is “OpenRead") or for writing.2
Assume further that method Open of class Connection is used for opening connections, that method AskConnect is used
for asking the user for permission to open a connection and that this latter method returns true in case of approval. Now,
consider the security policy, which allows applications to access existing ﬁles for reading only, and requires, once such a ﬁle
has been accessed, applications to obtain approval from the user each time a connection is to be opened. The policy also
does not allow the application to execute further if a ﬁle opening operation raises an exception. This policy is speciﬁed in
ConSpec as shown in Fig. 3.
We ﬁrst specify that the policy applies to each single execution of an application (line 1). The security state is represented
by the boolean variables accessed and permission, which are intended to record whether an existing ﬁle has been accessed
and whether there is an obtained permission (lines 2–4). The example policy contains three event clauses that state the
conditions for and effect of the security relevant actions: call to the method File.Open (lines 6–9), exceptional return from
the method File.Open (lines 11–13), call to the method Connection.Open (lines 15–18) and normal return from the method
GUI.AskConnect (lines 20–22). The event of an event clause is identiﬁed by the signature of the method mentioned in the
clause. The types of the method arguments are speciﬁed along with representative names, which have the event clause as
their scope. Themodiﬁers BEFORE and AFTERmark whether the call of or the normal return from the method speciﬁed in the
event clause is security relevant. If the exceptional return from amethod is considered security relevant, then this is speciﬁed
by the modiﬁer EXCEPTIONAL. For each event, there can exist at most one event clause per modiﬁer in the policy. In order to
1 We disregard the exceptional value since we do not, as yet, put constraints on these in ConSpec policies.
2 The methods used in the policy are not part of any standard Java API but have been chosen for the sake of the example.
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Fig. 4. Symbolic automaton for the example policy.
determine if the policy allows an event, the guards of the corresponding event clause are evaluated top to bottom using the
current value of the security state variables and the values of the relevant program variables. If none of the conditions hold
for the current event, it is a violating event and no more security relevant events are allowed by the policy.
ConSpec expressions. The security state variables of ConSpec are restricted to strings, integers and booleans. Expressions can
access object ﬁelds and use standard arithmetic and boolean expressions. Strings can be compared for equality or preﬁx. The
sets of expressions and boolean expressions of ConSpec are Exp and BoolExp, respectively.
The formal semantics of ConSpec policies is deﬁned in terms of symbolic security automata, which in turn induce ConSpec
automata. Fix a set Svar of security state variables and a set Var of program variables.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Symbolic Security Automaton). A symbolic security automaton is a tupleAs = (qs,As, δs, Inits), where:
(i) qs = Svar is the initial and only state;
(ii) Inits : qs → Val is an initialization function;
(iii) As = A
s ∪ As is a countable set of symbolic actions, where:
A


s ⊆ C ×M× (Type × Var)*are symbolic pre-actions, and
A

s ⊆ {({PrimType ∪C} × Var) ∪ Void ∪ {exc}} × C ×M× (Type × Var)*are symbolic post-actions;
(iv) δs = δ
s ∪ δs is a symbolic transition relation, where:
δ


s ⊆ A
s × BoolExp× (qs → Exp) and
δ

s ⊆ As × BoolExp× (qs → Exp)
are the symbolic pre- and post-transitions, respectively.
ConSpec policies and symbolic automata are two very similar representations. The set of security state variables of a
ConSpec policy is the state of the symbolic automaton. Each event clause gives rise to one symbolic action, and each guarded
command of the clause gives rise to a symbolic transition consisting of the security relevant action itself, the guard of the
guarded command in conjunction with negations of the guards that lie above it in the clause, and the effect of the guarded
command. The updates to security state variables,which are presented as a sequence of assignments in ConSpec, are captured
in the automaton as functions that return one ConSpec expression per symbolic state variable, determining the value of that
variable after the update.
In Fig. 4 we illustrate the construction on the earlier example, using "a" for accessed and "p" for permission. For instance,
the ﬁrst event clause of the policy gives rise to the action ﬁle_open and the automaton has two transitions for this action,
one per guard. The transition on the top center of the ﬁgure is for the ﬁrst guard and does not perform any updates on the
current security state. The transition for the second guard (on the right of the ﬁgure) sets accessed to true, on the other hand,
and applies only if the ﬁrst guard does not hold.
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Table 1
Security relevant actions induced by conﬁgurations.
act


P (C) Condition
(c,m, s,hb)
C = ((M, pc, s · [d] · s′ , lv) · R,h
)
M[pc] = invokevirtual c′.m, c deﬁnes type(d,h
).m, type(h
 , d) <: c′
(c,m, s,h
) ∈ A

act

P (C1,C2) Condition
(void, c,m, s,h
 ,ha)
C1 = ((M, pc, s · d · s′ , lv) · R,h
), C2 = ((M, pc + 1, s′ , lv) · R,h),
M[pc] = invokevirtual c′.m, c deﬁnes type(h
 , d).m, type(h
 , d) <: c′ ,
(void, c,m, s,h
 ,h) ∈ A
(v, c,m, s,h
 ,h)
C1 = ((M, pc, s · d · s′ , lv) · R,h
), C2 = ((M, pc + 1, v · s′ , lv) · R,h),
M[pc] = invokevirtual c′.m, c deﬁnes type(h
 , d).m, type(h
 , d) <: c′ ,
(v, c,m, s,h
 ,h) ∈ A
(exc, c,m, s,h
 ,h)
C1 = ((M, pc, s · d · s′ , lv) · R,h
), C2 = ((b)e · (M, pc, s · d · s′ , lv) · R,h),
M[pc] = invokevirtual c′.m, c deﬁnes type(h
 , d).m, type(h
 , d) <: c′ ,
(exc, c,m, s,h
 ,h) ∈ A
Symbolic automatadetermineConSpec automata in the followingway: LetAs = (qs,As, δs, Inits)be a symbolic automaton.
The ConSpec automaton induced byA is the automatonA = ((qs → Val)⊥, δ, Inits) over alphabet A, determined as follows:
• The post-actions of A are all tuples (v, c,m, v1 · · · vn,h
,h) such that there is a symbolic post-action as = (r, c,m, ((τ1 x1),
. . . , (τn xn)))with vi : τi for all i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and either r = τ x and v : τ or else r ∈ {void, exc}. The pre-actions are deﬁned
similarly.
• The post-transition function δ is deﬁned indirectly, by referring to the standard denotational semantic functions for
expressionse ∈ Expandbooleanexpressionsb ∈ BoolExp such that [[e]] : (SVar → Val) → (Var → Val) → H → H → Val
and [[b]] : (SVar → Val) → (Var → Val) → H → H → Val, deﬁned as expected. Then, if δs (as , b, E) in As, we deﬁne
δ(q, a) = q′ in A if and only if there exists an interpretation I and heaps h
 and h such that [[as]] I h
 h = a,
[[b]] q I h
 h = true, and [[E(v)]] q I h
 h = q′(x) for all x ∈ SVar. The pre-transition function δ
 is deﬁned similarly. In
addition, given post-action a

s , let B be the set of boolean expressions b such that δ

s (a

s , b, E) for some E. Then, for every
state q ∈ Q , interpretation I, and heaps h
 and h, we deﬁne δ(q, a) = ⊥ if [[as]] I h
 h = a and [[b]] q I h
 h = false for
all b ∈ B.
It is not difﬁcult to characterize the language of a ConSpec automaton obtained from a symbolic ConSpec automatonAs
directly in terms ofAs itself.
5. Monitoring with ConSpec automata
In this section, we ﬁrst formalize the inﬁnite or ﬁnite sequence of security relevant actions induced by a target program
execution. Each target transition can give rise to zero, one, or two security relevant actions, namely, in the latter case, a
preaction followed by a postaction. Given the action set A, and the conﬁgurations C1 and C2, we deﬁne the security relevant
preaction, act


A
(C1), of the conﬁguration C1, and the corresponding postaction act

A
(C1,C2), as in Table 1. If none of the
conditions of the table hold, the corresponding action is .
We obtain the security relevant trace, srtA(w), of an execution w by lifting the operations act


A
and act

A
co-inductively to
executions in the following way:
srtA() =  srtA(C) = act
A(C)
srtA(C1C2 ·w) = act
A(C1) · actA(C1,C2) · srtA(C2 ·w)
Then a target programT adheres to a policyP , if the security trace of each executionof T is in the languageof the corresponding
automaton AP , i.e.
∀E ∈ 	(T). srtA(E) ∈ LAP
Monitor co-execution. A basic application of a ConSpec automaton is to execute it alongside a target program to monitor for
policy compliance. We can view such an execution as an interleavingw = (C0, q0)(C1, q1) · · · such that C0 and q0 is the initial
conﬁguration and state of T andA, respectively, and such that for each consecutive pair (Ci, qi)(Ci+1, qi+1), either the target
(only) progresses:
Ci −→JVM Ci+1 and qi+1 = qi
or the automata (only) progresses:
Ci+1 = Ci and ∃a ∈ A. δ(qi, a) = qi+1
In the former case we write (Ci, qi) −→JVM (Ci+1, qi+1), and in the latter case we write (Ci, qi) −→AUT (Ci+1, qi+1). We can
assume without loss of generality that at most one of these cases apply, for instance by tagging each interleaving step.
I. Aktug et al., / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78 (2009) 304–339 311
The ﬁrst projection function w ↓ 1 on interleavings w = (C1, q1)(C2, q2) · · · extracts the underlying execution as follows:
((C1, q1)(C2, q2) ·w′) ↓ 1 =
{
C1 · (((C2, q2) ·w′) ↓ 1) C1 −→JVM C2
((C2, q2) ·w′) ↓ 1) otherwise
(C, q) ↓ 1 = C
To similarly extract automata derivations we use the (co-inductive) function extract such that
extract((C1, q1)(C2, q2)w) = q1q2extract((C2, q2)w)
if (C1, q1) −→AUT (C2, q2),
extract((C1, q1)(C2, q2)w) = act
A(C1)actA(C1,C2)extract((C2, q2)w),
if (C1, q1) −→JVM (C2, q2), extract(C, q) = act
A(C), and extract() = . We call such an extracted sequence of automaton
states and security relevant action a potential derivation. Note that extract(w) may well be ﬁnite even if w is inﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Co-Execution). Let E
 = {qq′a
 | q, q′ ∈ Q , a
 ∈ A
, δ
(q, a
) = q′}, E = {aqq′ | q, q′ ∈ Q , a ∈ A, δ(q, a) = q′}. An
interleaving w is a co-execution if
extract(w) ∈ (E
 ∪ E)*∪ (E
 ∪ E)ω
In other words, an interleaving is a co-execution, if the potential derivation it extracts corresponds to a real derivation.
Amonitor is conservative if allmonitored executions are also executions of the original program, i.e. if themonitor does not
introduce new behavior.Whenmonitoring is done by ConSpec automata in the sense captured by the notion of co-execution,
the monitor is correct and conservative.
Theorem 5.2 (Correctness of Monitoring by Co-execution). Let T be a program, and P a policy. The following holds,where A is the
action set of AP :
{w ↓ 1 | w is a co-execution of T and AP } = {E ∈ 	(T) | srtA(E) ∈ LAP }
We present the proofs to the results of the paper in Appendix B.
A corollary of this result is that the set of executions of a program that obeys the policy are identical to the set of executions
of the program monitored for the policy.
Corollary 5.3. Program T adheres to policy P if, and only if, for each execution E of T there is a co-execution w for the automaton
AP such that w ↓ 1 = E.
6. Speciﬁcation of monitoring
We specify monitor inlining correctness using annotations in a Floyd-style logic for bytecode. The idea behind our
annotation scheme is the following. In a ﬁrst annotation, referred to as policy annotation (or level I), we deﬁne a monitor
for the given policy by means of “ghost” variables, updated before or after every security relevant action according to the
symbolic automaton induced by the given security policy. In a second annotation, referred to as synchronisation annotation
(or level II), we add assertions that check at all relevant programpoints that the actual inlinedmonitor (represented by global
program variables) agrees with the speciﬁed one (represented by ghost variables).
6.1. Annotation language
We specify self-monitoring using annotations in a Floyd-style logic for bytecode, which is a specialization of the program
logic of Bannwart and Müller [8]. As an extension to their logic, our annotation language makes use of “ghost” variables.
These are essentially speciﬁcation variables that can be assigned values by a multi-assignment statement.
Methods are equipped with annotations consisting of assertions on the extended state (current conﬁguration and
current ghost variable environment), and ghost variable assignments. We ﬁrst introduce the syntax of this annotation
language.
Assertions. Let g range over ghost variables, i over natural numbers, and let Op range over a standard, not further speciﬁed,
collection of unary and binary operations on strings and integers, while Bop range over boolean operations. Expressions e
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and assertions a have the following shape:
e ::= ⊥ | v | g | e.f | s[i] | ri | Op e | e Op e
a ::= e Bop e | e : c | e <: c | ¬a | a ∧ a | a ∨ a
Here, s[i] is the value at the ith position of the current operation stack, if deﬁned, and⊥ otherwise, e : c is a classmembership
test and e <: c is a subclass membership test. The notation ri denotes the ith local variable. The assertions are evaluated with
respect to extended states. Extended states consist of a program conﬁguration C and a ghost environment σ that maps ghost
variables to integer values, addresses or the value ⊥, which captures that the variable is undeﬁned. Referring to standard
denotational semantics, we assume a semantic function ‖a‖(C, σ) that returns, for assertion a and extended state (C, σ), a
truth value.
Annotation example. The following example assertion states that if the address at the top of the stack points to an object
of type GUI in the heap, then the ghost variables ga and gp are both deﬁned.
s[0] : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)
Ghost variable instructions. Ghost variables are assigned using a single, guarded multi-assignment of the form
−→gs := a1 → −→e1 | · · · | am → −→em (1)
where −→gs is a vector of ghost variables and −→ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are vectors of expressions, such that the arities (and types)
of −→gs and the −→ei match. The multi-assignment is performed with vector −→ei if guard ai is the ﬁrst guard (from left) that
holds in the current extended state. If no guard is true, the ghost state is assigned the constant vector with all elements
⊥ and the arity matching to that of −→gs . This is the case, in particular, when m = 0 in (1) above. This case is written as
follows: −→gs := (). The right hand side of conditional assignments are referred to as conditional expressions and are denoted
by ce.
Method annotations. A target program is annotated by an extended environment *, which maps method references M
to tuples (P,H,A, Requires, Ensures) such that A is an assignment to each program point n ∈ Dom(P) of a sequence, ψ , of
atomic annotations, i.e. assertions and ghost variable assignments. Requires also consists of a sequence of atomic anno-
tations, while Ensures is a single assertion. These two clauses do not mention method arguments or return values. The
precondition Requires is allowed to contain ghost assignments, since we occasionally use these clauses to initialize ghost
variables.
Annotation semantics. In the absence of ghost variable assignments the notion of annotation validity is the expected one, i.e.
the assertions annotating a given programpoint (or the point of exceptional return) holdwhenever control is at that program
point. To extend this account to ghost variables, the ghost variable assignments should be given a suitable semantics. We
present such a semantics in this section, which essentially treats ghost variables as program variables. For this purpose, the
program state is extended by a store for ghost variables which is altered only by ghost variable assignments, method calls
and returns.
The rewrite semantics we use for annotated programs is built on top of the transition relation −→JVM of section 2 and
is shown in Table 2. The semantics uses extended conﬁgurations that are quintuples of the form (ψ ,C, σ ,) such that ψ is
the sequence of annotations remaining to be evaluated for the current program point of C, and σ is the ghost environment
introduced above, mapping ghost variables to values. Each ghost environment σ can be partitioned to the global and local
ghost environments σl and σg where the domain of σg is the variables of the ghost state, which are declared and initialized
in the beginning of 〈main〉 and the domain of σl is all other ghost variables that have been set values in the current method.
Finally  is a sequence of local ghost (variable) environments. The top element of  is the local ghost environment that
belongs to the caller of the current method. Each method call causes a new local ghost environment σ0
l
to be created, which
is deﬁned as [gpc → 0]. Note that local ghost variables are not allowed to occur in Requires or Ensures clauses, like it is the
case for local program variables.
We overload M, pc, A, Requires, Ensures, to refer to the ﬁrst, second, third, fourth, and ﬁfth projections on conﬁgurations,
respectively. MethodRet holds of a conﬁguration if the program counter of the top frame points to a return instruction.
MethodCall holds of a conﬁguration if the program counter of the top frame points to a method invocation instruction,
which resolves to an applicationmethod call. Notice that these predicates cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously. The predicate
Unhandled holds of a conﬁguration if it has an exceptional frame on top of the frame stack, and *does not contain a handler
for that exception in the current method. Finally, Exc holds of a conﬁguration that has an exceptional frame on the top of the
stack.
The condition Assert(a,C, σ) in Rule (1) always returns true, and does not effect the execution. But as a side-effect causes
the predicate argument a to be “asserted”, e.g. to appear on some output channel. The asserted predicate is valid if ‖a ‖ (C, σ)‖
returns true. Rules (2), (3) and (4) capture the ghost variable assignment semantics as described above. Rule (5) is for intra-
procedural execution, and applies to exception handling steps, but not to exception raising steps, which are handled by rule
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Table 2
Operational semantics of annotated programs.
(1)
Assert(a,C, σ)
* (aψ ,C, σ ,) → (ψ ,C, σ ,)
(2)
‖a1‖(C, σ) = true, m > 0
* ((−→gs := a1 → −→e1 | · · · |am → −→em)ψ ,C, σ ,) →
(ψ ,C, σ [−→gs →‖ −→e1 ‖ (C, σ)],)
(3)
‖a1‖(C, σ) /= true, m > 0
* ((−→gs := a1 → −→e1 | · · · |am → −→em)ψ ,C, σ ,) →
((−→gs := a2 → −→e2 | · · · |am → −→em)ψ ,C, σ ,)
(4)
·
* ((−→gs := ())ψ ,C, σ ,) → (ψ ,C, σ [−→gs → −→⊥ ],)
(5)
C −→JVM C ′ ¬(MethodCall(C) ∨MethodRet(C)) ∧ ¬Exc(C ′))
* (,C, σ ,) → (A(*(M(C ′)))(pc(C ′)),C ′ , σ ,)
(6)
C −→JVM C ′ , MethodRet(C) ∨ Unhandled(C)
* (,C, σg unionmulti σl , σ ′l · ) → (Ensures(*(M(C))),C ′ , σg unionmulti σ ′l ,)
(7)
C −→JVM C ′ , MethodCall(C) ∧ ¬Exc(C ′)
* (,C, σg unionmulti σl ,) →
(Requires(*(M(C ′))) · AM(C ′)[1],C ′ , σg unionmulti σ0l , σl · )
(8)
C −→JVM C ′ ¬Exc(C) ∧ Exc(C ′)
* (,C, σ ,) → (,C ′ , σ ,)
(8). Rule (6) causes any assertions in Ensures to be asserted at times ofmethod exit, which aremethod returns and exceptional
exits. Note also that the values assigned to the local ghost variables σl by the current method are discarded as the method
terminates, and instead the environment is updated to use the assignments σ ′
l
of the calling method. Similarly, if the current
instruction is a method call to an application method and executes without raising exceptions, rule (7) causes all assertions
in the Requires clause of the calledmethod to be asserted.When a newmethod starts executing, the local ghost environment
of the callermethod are pushed to the stack and the ghost environment uses the environment σ0
l
. Finally, when the execution
of an instruction raises an exception, no predicates are asserted, as captured by rule (8).
The initial extended conﬁguration (ψ0,C0, σ0,0) of program T is as follows:ψ0 is Requires(
*(〈main〉)) · A〈main〉[1], C0 is the
initial conﬁguration of T, σ0 = σ0l = [gpc → 0], 0 = .
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Validity of an Annotated Program). A program annotated according to the rules set up above is valid for the
extended environment*, if all predicates asserted as a result of a*-derivation (ψ0,C0, σ0,0) → · · · → (ψn,Cn, σn,n) → · · ·
are valid, where (ψ0,C0, σ0,0) is the initial extended conﬁguration of the program.
6.2. Policy annotations (Level I)
The policy annotations deﬁne a monitor for the given policy by means of ghost variables. The ghost variables, which
constitute the speciﬁed security state, are initialized in the precondition of the 〈main〉 method and updated at relevant points
by annotating all the methods deﬁned by the classes of the target program. We call each such method a target method.
When adding the level I annotations, we assume that 〈main〉 is not called by any target method (including itself) and that
all exceptions that may be raised by a security relevant instruction (i.e. an instruction that may lead to a security relevant
action) are coveredbyanexceptionhandler.Wealso assume that theexceptionhandling is structured such thatunexceptional
execution cannot "fall through" to an exception handler, i.e. the onlyway an instruction in an exception handler gets executed
is if an exceptionhas been raised previously in the execution and caught by thehandler that the instruction belongs to. Finally,
we assume without loss of generality that there are no jumps to instructions below method invocations, since such jumps
can be eliminated by inserting a no-effect instruction (such as nop) after the invocation instruction and redirecting the jump
to the instruction after.
Updating the speciﬁed security state. The updates to the speciﬁed security state are done according to the transitions of the
symbolic automaton. If the automaton does not have a transition for a security relevant method call, the call is violating and
the corresponding annotation sets the value of the speciﬁed state to undeﬁned. Such a program should terminate without
executing the next security relevant action in order to adhere to the policy. This is speciﬁed by asserting, as a precondition
to each security relevant method invocation and before each update to the speciﬁed state, that the speciﬁed state is not
undeﬁned.
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If the execution of a method invocation instruction of a target method may lead to a preaction of the automaton, then an
annotation is inserted as a precondition to this instruction, which updates the speciﬁed security state. If amethod invocation
instruction may lead to a postaction, we record the object the method is called on, values of the method arguments (and
possibly a part of the heap) by assigning them to ghost variables as the precondition to the instruction. The updates to the
speciﬁed state are done in the postcondition of the instruction, if themethod invocation can lead to a normal (unexceptional)
postaction. If the instructioncancauseanexceptionalpostaction,however, theupdate to thespeciﬁedsecurity state is inserted
as a precondition to the ﬁrst instruction of each exception handler that cover the instruction. The recorded label is used then
at the handler to resolvewhich instruction has caused the exception, so that the correct update (or no update if the exception
was raised by an irrelevant instruction) is performed.
Preliminary deﬁnitions. In the deﬁnitions below, assume given a program T and a policy P . LetAs = (qs,As, δs, Inits) be the
symbolic automaton induced byP , and let qs = {s1, . . . , sn}. We deﬁne the set Aes ⊆ As of exceptional symbolic post-actions as
those post-actionswhich have the value exc as their ﬁrst component. Given a symbolic action setA′s, the functionRS((c,m),A′s)
returns those subclasses c′ of c forwhich themethod (c′,m) is deﬁnedbya class c′′ such thatA′s has anactionwith the reference
(c′′,m). In the annotations, the ghost variables that represent the security state are named identically with the security state
variables of the automaton, and we use the tuple −→gs = (s1, . . . , sn) in guarded multi-assignments. We use the ghost variable
gpc to record labels of security relevant instructions. Ghost variables g also used for recording stack values. For an expression
mapping E : qs → Exp, let −→eE denote the corresponding expression tuple and for a boolean ConSpec expression b ∈ BoolExp,
let ab denote the corresponding assertion.
Level I annotations. Further below, we deﬁne for everymethodM, three arrays of annotations: a pre-annotation array A


M[i], a
post-annotation array A

M[i][j], and an exceptional annotation array AeM[i][k], where i ranges over the instructions of method
M. The second index j ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2} indicateswhether the annotationwill be placed as a precondition of the instruction
(j, k = 0), as aprecondition to thenext instruction (j, k = 1), or as aprecondition to all the exceptionhandlers of the instruction
(k = 2). The predicate Handler holds for a label L and a method M if L is a destination of some exception handler, i.e.
(L1, L2, L, c) ∈ HM for some labels L1, L2, and class name c. In addition, we deﬁne Exc(L,M) as the sequence of all annotations
AeM[L′][2] where L′ is a security relevant instruction and there exists an exception handler (L1, L2, L, c) ∈ HM such that L1 ≤
L′ < L2, and as  if such an L′ does not exist.
Given these annotations, the level I annotation of program T is given for each application method M as a precondition
RequiresIM and an array A
I
M of annotation sequences deﬁned as follows (where L > 0):
RequiresIM =
{
(−→gs := −−→eInits ) ifM = 〈main〉
 otherwise
AIM[1] = A
M[1] · AM[1][0] · AeM[1][0]
AIM[L] =
{
Exc(L,M) · A
M[L] · AM[L][0] · AeM[L][0] if Handler(L,M)
AeM[L − 1][1] · AM[L − 1][1] · A
M[L] · AM[L][0] · AeM[L][0] otherwise
The annotation Requires〈main〉 initializes the ghost state using function Inits of the automaton. In the following we deﬁne the
annotation arrays mentioned in the above deﬁnition.
After annotations. For every method M, the elements of the post-annotation array A

M[i][j] are deﬁned for each label L as
follows:
(i) If the instruction isnotaninvokevirtual instructionor isof the formM[L] = invokevirtual (c.m)whereRS((c,m),As \
Aes ) = ∅, we deﬁne the pre- and postconditions to be empty:
A

M[L][0] = AM[L][1] = 
(ii) Otherwise, if the instruction isof the formM[L]=invokevirtual (c.m)with (c.m) : (γ →τ)and |γ |=nandRS((c,m),As \
Aes ) = {c′1, . . . , c′p}, then the precondition of the instruction saves the arguments and the object in ghost variables:
A

M[L][0] = ((g0, . . . , gn−1, gthis) := (s[0], . . . , s[n])) · Deﬁned
The assertion Deﬁned checks if the ghost variables are deﬁned:
Deﬁned = (gthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ gthis : c′p) ⇒ (−→gs /= −→⊥ )
while the postcondition of the instruction uses these saved values to compute the new security state:
A

M[L][1] = (−→gs := α1 | · · · | αm | α)
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Fig. 5. An application method with level I annotations for the example policy.
where the αk are the guarded expressions
(−→gs /= −→⊥ ) ∧ gthis : c′i ∧ abρi → −→eE ρi
where class c′′ deﬁnes (c′
i
,m) and there exists a

s = (r, c′′,m, (τ0x0, . . . τn−1 xn−1)) ∈ As \ Aes such that (as , b, E) ∈ δs . The
substitution ρi is deﬁned as [s[0]/x, g0/x0, . . . , gn−1/xn−1, gthis/this] if r = (τ x) and as [g0/x0, . . . , gn−1/xn−1, gthis/this]
if r = void. Finally, α = ¬(gthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ gthis : c′p) → −→gs .
Level I Annotation Example. A level I annotated application method for the example policy 3 is shown in Fig. 5. The ghost
state is represented by the ghost variables ga and gp, i.e.
−→gs = (ga, gp). (The setting of the ghost variable gpc is ignored since
the policy does not include an exceptional clause.) The annotations are valid if the class GUI does not have any subclasses.
The annotations are identical as long as all subclasses of this class overrides AskConnect.
TheannotationarrayA


M is deﬁnedsimilar toA

M except that the transitionsof theautomatononpre-actionsare considered.
The values of the arguments of the security relevant instruction can be obtained by accessing the stack directly, so the
argument names in the guards and update expressions of the symbolic automaton should be substitutedwith corresponding
stack positions in this case.
The exceptional annotation array AeM[i][k] is deﬁned considering transitions of the automaton on exceptional post-actions
(the set Ae). The precondition AeM[L][0] of an instruction M[L] that may cause an exceptional post-action saves its label L in
the ghost variable gpc, in addition to recording the object and arguments to the method. The conditions of the ghost variable
update placed in the precondition to the corresponding handler AeM[L][2], then include the conjunct gpc = L to check that the
exception was indeed raised by this instruction. The ghost variable gpc is set back to 0 after the update in the annotation (i.e.
in AeM[L][2]) or if the method never raises an exception (i.e. in AeM[L][1]).
The formalizations are presented here for completeness.
Before annotations. For everymethodM, the elements of the pre-annotation array A


M[i] are deﬁned for each label L as follows:
(i) If the instruction is not an invokevirtual instruction or is of the form M[L] = invokevirtual (c.m) where
RS((c,m),A


s) = ∅, we deﬁne the precondition to be empty: A
M[L] = .
(ii) Otherwise, if the instruction is of the form M[L] = invokevirtual (c.m) with (c.m) : (γ → τ) and |γ | = n and
RS((c,m),A


s) = {c′1, . . . , c′p}, then the precondition of the instruction computes the new security state using the ar-
guments and the object of the called method and updates the ghost variables:
A


M[L] = (−→gs := α1 | · · · | αm | α) · Deﬁned
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The assertion Deﬁned
 checks if the ghost variables are deﬁned:
Deﬁned
 = (s[n] : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ s[n] : c′p) ⇒ (−→gs /= −→⊥ )
The αk are the guarded expressions
(−→gs /= −→⊥ ) ∧ s[n] : c′i ∧ abρi → −→eE ρi
where class c′′ deﬁnes (c′
i
,m) and there exists a


s = (c′′,m, (τ0x0, . . . , τn−1xn−1)) ∈ A
s such that (a
s, b, E) ∈ δ
s . The substi-
tution ρi is deﬁned as [s[0]/x0, . . . , s[n− 1]/xn−1, s[n]/this]. Finally, α = ¬(s[n] : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ s[n] : c′p) → −→gs .
Exceptional annotations. For every method M, the elements of the exceptional annotation array AeM[L] are deﬁned for each
label L as follows:
(i) If the instruction is not an invokevirtual instruction or is of the form M[L] = invokevirtual (c.m) where
RS((c,m),Aes ) = ∅, we deﬁne the pre- and post-conditions to be empty: AeM[L][0] = AeM[L][1] = AeM[L][1] = .
(ii) Otherwise, if the instruction is of the form M[L] = invokevirtual (c.m) with (c.m) : (γ → τ) and |γ | = n and
RS((c,m),Aes ) = {c′1, . . . , c′p}, then the precondition of the instruction saves the arguments, the object and the label
of the instruction in ghost variables:
AeM[L][0] = ((g0, . . . , gn−1, gthis, gpc) := (s[0], . . . , s[n]), L) · Deﬁnede
The assertion Deﬁnede checks if the ghost variables are deﬁned:
Deﬁnede = ((gthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ gthis : c′p) ⇒ (−→gs /= −→⊥ ))
The postcondition of the instruction resets the value of gpc to 0. Notice that this annotation gets executed only if the
method invocation did not return with an exception
AeM[L][1] = gpc := 0
The precondition of each handler that covers this instruction uses gpc to check whether the caught exception was
thrown by a security relevant instruction. If the exception was raised by a method called by the instruction with the
relevant label, the annotation uses the saved values to compute the new security state:
AeM[L][2] = (−→gs := α1 | · · · | αm | α) · (gpc := 0)
where the αk are the guarded expressions
(gpc = L) ∧ (−→gs /= −→⊥ ) ∧ gthis : c′i ∧ abρi → −→eE ρi
and where class c′′ deﬁnes (c′
i
,m) and there exists aes = (exc, c′′,m, (τ0x0, . . . , τn−1xn−1)), aes ∈ Aes such that (aes , b, E) ∈ δes .
The substitution ρi is deﬁned as [g0/x0, . . . , gn−1/xn−1, gthis/this]. Finally, α = ¬(gthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ gthis : c′p) → −→gs .
Each execution of a program that is valid with respect to level I annotations for policy P corresponds to a co-execution
of the program and the automaton for P where the automaton states coincide with the speciﬁed security state, hence the
program adheres to P .
Theorem 6.2. (Level I Characterization) The level I annotation of program T for policy P is valid if, and only if, T adheres to P.
6.3. Synchronisation annotations (Level II)
An inlined program can be expected to contain an explicit representation of the security state, an embedded state, which
is updated in synchrony with the execution of security relevant actions. The level II annotations aim to capture this idea in a
generic enough form that it is independent ofmany design choices a speciﬁc inlinermaymake. In particular, it seems natural
to require of an inlined monitor that it maintains agreement between the ghost state and the embedded state immediately
prior to execution of a security relevant action. That is, program and monitor state are both tested and, where necessary,
updatedwhenever a security relevant action is about to be performed. This is by nomeans a necessary condition: for instance,
a monitor implementation may in advance determine that some ﬁxed sequence of security relevant actions is permissible
without necessarily reﬂecting this through an explicit sequence of updates to the embedded state. Thus, in the middle of
such a sequence, the embedded state and the ghost state may disagree. In this paper, however, we assume that this type of
optimized inlining is not performed.
The second assumption we make in this section is that updates to the embedded state are made locally, that is by the
same method that executes the security relevant method call. This allows correctness to be expressed by asserting equality
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Fig. 6. An application method with level II annotations for the example policy.
of the ghost state and the embedded state for every method at point of entry, at normal and exceptional exit, and at each
method invocation. This compositionality property has the important advantage that level II annotations can uniformly
treat all methods that can be called, as a result of virtual method resolution, by the same instruction: The speciﬁed and the
embedded states are synchronized at all call points, not just at the points of security relevant method call.
For simplicitywe assume that the embedded state is determined as a ﬁxed vector−→ms of global static variables of the target
program, of types corresponding pointwise to the type of ghost state vector −→gs . The synchronisation assertion is the equality−→gs = −→ms, and the level II annotations are formed by appending the synchronization assertion to the level I annotations of each
methodM of the target program at the following points:
1. Each annotation A(*(M))(i) such that P(*(M))(i) is an invoke or a return instruction.
2. The annotation Ensures(*(M)).
Level II Annotation Example A level II annotated application method for the example policy of section 4 is shown in Fig. 6.
This is an augmented version of Fig. 5, where the embedded state consists of the static ﬁelds accessed and permission of
the SecState class. The Ensures clause is the synchronization assertion
(ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, SecState.permission)
and Requires = . The annotated method is valid since the embedded state is updated as is described by the policy, after a
call to the method GUI.AskConnect.
Level II characterization. We now explain in what sense the level II annotations characterize the two conditions assumed in
this section (the synchronous update assumption, and the method-local update assumption).
Consider a program T with a level II annotated environment *. Consider an execution E = C0C1 · · · from an initial
conﬁguration C0 of T. We sample the embedded state
−→ms at all conﬁgurations that are either invoke instructions, return
instructions, the ﬁrst instruction of a method, or an unhandled exception. More precisely, the index i is a sampling point if
one of the following three conditions holds:
1. The top frame of Ci has the shape (M, pc, s, lv), andM[pc] is either an invokevirtual instruction, or a return instruction.
2. The conﬁguration Ci−1 has the shape (M, pc, s, lv) : R;h where M[pc] is an invokevirtual instruction, and Ci has the
shape (N, 1, , lv′) (M, pc, s, lv) : R;h.
3. Alternatively, Ci is of the shape (b)e(M, pc, s, lv) : R;hwhere there is no handler that covers label pc for b inM.
We can then construct a sequence w(E,−→ms) = (C0, q0)(C1, q1) · · · such that:
• q0 is the initial automaton state,
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• for all sampling points i > 0, qi = Ci(−→ms), where Ci(−→ms) denotes the value of −→ms in conﬁguration Ci, and
• for any two consecutive sampling points i and i′, for all j : i ≤ j < i′, qj = qi.
In other words, the embedded state is sampled at the sampling points and maintained constant in between.
The role of the sequence w(E,−→ms) is roughly similar to the role of interleavings in Section 5. However, a slightly different
treatment is needed here since the sequence q0q1 · · · may not necessarily correspond to an automaton run. This is so for
the case of a postaction followed by a preaction. Then the intermediate automaton state is not sampled, as there is no well-
deﬁned point where this might be done. Also, the construction needs to account for the method-local nature of embedded
state updates.
For this reason, we deﬁne the operation extractII, taking sequencesw to strings over the alphabet Q ∪ A ∪ {brk}where brk
is a distinguished symbol, by the following conditions:
• extractII((C1, q1)(C2, q2)w) = q1 act
(C1) act(C1,C2) q2 extractII((C2, q2)w), if C1 is an API method call.
• extractII((C1, q1)(C2, q2)w) = q1brkq2 extractII((C2, q2)w), if C1 is an application method call and C2 is not exceptional,
i.e. C2 is an entry point to the method.
• extractII((C, q)w) = qbrkq extractII(w), if C is a return point from an application method, either normal or exceptional.
• extractII((C1, q1)(C2, q2)w) = extractII((C2, q2)w), if none of the above conditions hold.
• extractII((C, q)) = q act
(C) if C is a method call.
• extractII() = .
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Method-local Co-execution). Let
0 = { brk, q, a
, a | q ∈ Q , a
 ∈ A
, a ∈ A},
1 = { brk} ∪ Q ∪ E
 ∪ E ∪ {aqq′a
 | ∃q′′.δ
(q, a
) = q′′, δ(q′′, a) = q′},
2 = {qq′q′′, qq′q, brkqq′a, brkqq′ brk, brkqq′q′, qaq′,
qa
aq′, a
qq′q′, a
qq′ brk, a
qq′a, q brkq′, qa
q′ | q /= q′ /= q′′}
A sequence w is a method-local co-execution, if
extractII(w) ∈ (*1∪ ω1 ) \ (*0 · 2 · (*0∪ ω0 ))
We can then extend Theorem 6.2 to the situation where a target program T has a monitor for the given policy inlined
into it.
Theorem 6.4. (Level II Characterization) The level II annotation of T with embedded state −→ms is valid if, and only if, for each
execution E of T, the sequence w(E,−→ms) is a method-local co-execution.
In the next section, we describe and prove correct a scheme of inlining, which satisﬁes both the assumptions of syn-
chronous and method-local update. The execution of a program that is proven to be inlined correctly in this manner then
always yields method-local co-executions.
7. Correctness of inlining
Weuse the annotation scheme described in the previous section to show that programs inlined by a class of inliners in the
ﬂavor of PoET/PSLang [16,15] are self-monitoring. The proof assumes that inlined blocks satisfy a certain property, which we
pin down. As an example we ﬁrst describe a simple, method-local monitor inlining scheme. Then we show for these inlined
programs how level II annotations can be efﬁciently completed to produce fully annotated code, thus reducing the policy
adherence problem to checking the validity of the full annotations.
7.1. A simple inlining scheme
The inlining scheme inputs a ConSpec policy and a program, and inserts code for (i) storing the security state and (ii) for
updating it according to the policy clauses at calls to security relevant methods.
Storing the security state. The inliner adds a single class deﬁnition to the program. The class stores the embedded state in
its static ﬁelds. Since this new class is not in the previous name space, the embedded state is safe from interference by the
target program. Here, we assume that SecState is a fresh name for the target program, and use this name for referring to the
class storing the embedded state.
Compiling policy body to bytecode. The ﬁrst part of the transformation compiles the policy to bytecode, and is independent
of the method(s) for which inlining is to be performed. For each clause in the policy, a code fragment is produced. These
fragments are inlined in application methods in the rewriting stage.
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Fig. 7. Inlining of an instruction.
Each clause of a policy consists of an event modiﬁer, an event speciﬁcation and a list of guarded commands. The created
code evaluates, in turn, the guards and either updates the security state according to the update block associated with the
ﬁrst condition that holds or quits the program if none of them hold.3
The variables that occur in an event clause are of three kinds: security state variables, method arguments and ﬁelds of
method arguments. Security state variables are stored in the SecState class. Since the ﬁelds storing the embedded state are
static, they are created and initialized as soon as the class is loaded to the JVM. Actual arguments of a method (including
the reference to the object it operates on) reside on top of the stack immediately before the method invocation. In order
to use argument values while computing the new values of the security state variables, the arguments are copied from the
stack to local variables that are not used by the original program. Since local variables of the calling method are not affected
by the execution of the callee, argument values stored in this manner can be accessed even after the control returns to the
calling method. Finally, ﬁelds of arguments are accessed using the arguments and the heap. Notice that ConSpec policies
specify only updates to security state variables. The compiled code uses fresh variables for both the security state and storing
arguments. Therefore inlining does not modify the original program behavior beyond forcing its exit upon violation.
Rewriting methods according to policy. The rewriting process consists of identifying method invocation instructions that
lead to security relevant actions (security relevant instructions), and for each such instruction, inserting code produced
by policy compilation in an appropriate manner. The inlined code is depicted for a single instruction in Fig. 7. The inliner
inserts, immediately before the security relevant instruction, code that records the object the method is called for, and the
arguments (and possibly parts of the heap) in local variables. Then, code for the relevant BEFORE clauses of the policy (if any)
is inserted. Next, the object and the method arguments are restored on the stack. If there are AFTER clauses in the policy
for the instruction, ﬁrst the return value (if there is any) is recorded in a local variable, the code compiled from the AFTER
clauses is inlined, followed by code to restore the return value on the stack. Finally, if there are EXCEPTIONAL clauses for
the instruction, an exception handler is created that covers only the method invocation instruction and catches all types
3 In order to abort the program, the method System.exit() can be used in standard API’s, so that a security violation is distinguished from a normal
return.
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Table 3
Weakest precondition function wp(M[L]).
M[L] wp(M[L])
dup unshift((head(AM [L + 1]))[s[1]/s[0]])
iload r / aload r unshift((head(AM [L + 1]))[r/s[0]])
istore r / astore r (shift(head(AM [L + 1])))[s[0]/r]
putstatic m (shift(head(AM [L + 1])))[s[0]/m]
goto L′ head(AM [L′])
ifeq L′ (s[0] = 0 ⇒ shift(head(AM [L′])))∧
(¬(s[0] = 0) ⇒ shift(head(AM [L + 1])))
instanceof c s[0] <: c ⇒ (head(AM [L + 1]))[1/s[0]]∧
¬(s[0] <: c) ⇒ (head(AM [L + 1]))[0/s[0]]
invokevirtual c.m (shiftn(head(AM [L + 1])))[fc.m(s[0], . . . , s[n])/s[n]]
invokestatic c.m (shiftn−1(head(AM [L + 1])))[fc.m(s[0], . . . , s[n− 1])/s[n− 1]]
of exceptions. It is placed highest amongst the handlers for this label in the handler list, so that whenever the instruction
throws an exception, this handler will be executed. The code of this exception handler consists of code created for the related
EXCEPTIONAL clauses and ends by rethrowing the caught exception. All (original) exception handlers of the program that
cover the security relevant instruction are redirected to cover this last throw instruction instead.
Method resolution. Due to virtual method call resolution, execution of an invocation instruction can give rise to different
security relevant actions. The inliner inserts code to resolve, at runtime, the signature of the method that is called, using
the type of the object that the method is invoked on, and information on which methods have been overridden. A check to
compare this signature against the signature of the event mentioned in the clause is prepended to code compiled for the
clause4.
It is straightforward to implement this scheme as Java bytecode includes instructions or APImethods thatmap to the basic
arithmetic and string operations included in the expression language of ConSpec. We have implemented such an inliner,
which is available at [1].
7.2. Correctness of inlining
We ﬁrst describe how level II annotations for programs inlined with an inliner following the scheme described above
can be efﬁciently completed to an (equivalent) full annotation. We then show that validity of the full annotation – and thus
policy adherence – holds for such programs and is efﬁciently checkable.
Annotation completion is facilitatedby theweakest precondition functionwp(M[L]), adapted for JVM instructions fromthe
weakest precondition function of Bannwart andMüller [8]. Table 3 contains the deﬁnition of the function for the instructions
occurring in the examples. The function shift(A) denotes the substitution, for all i, of s[i] by s[i + 1] in assertion A, while
function unshift(A) denotes the inverse function. The last two rows of the table refer only to calls to API methods used by the
inliner - these are side-effect free and therefore treated as atomic operations. In both rows, n denotes the arity of method
c.m, and fc.m denotes the operation implemented by method c.m (which is of arity n+ 1 in the case of invokevirtual, with
the reference to the object as an implicit argument).
The full annotation uses a normalizing function norm on annotations,with the combined effect of conjuncting consecutive
logical assertions and propagating weakest preconditions backward:
norm(α) = α
norm(γ · α0 · α1) = norm(γ · (α0 ∧ α1))
norm(γ · (−→g := ce) · α) = norm(γ · α[ce/−→g ]) · (−→g := ce) · α
where γ is an annotation sequence, and α[ce/−→g ] is substitution in α of each ghost variable gi ∈ −→g by the conditional
expression cei, obtained from ce by replacing each expression vector
−→eE occurring in cewith its i-th component. The function
head returns the ﬁrst element of an annotation sequence.
Full annotation. A full annotation is obtained from level II annotation as follows.
(1) Requires(*(M)) and Ensures(*(M)) are the synchronisation assertion, −→gs = −→ms.
(2) For all non-inlined instructionsM[L], not (level II) annotated with the synchronisation assertion,
AIIIM[L] = norm(AIIM[L] · (−→gs = −→ms))
4 This can be accomplished using the instanceof instruction or using the Reﬂect API.
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(3) For all (non-inlined) potentially post-security relevant instructionsM[L],
AIIIM[L] = norm(AIIM[L] · (g0 = r0) · . . . · (gn−1 = rn−1) · (gthis = rthis))
where r0, . . . , rn−1, rthis are the local variables used by the inliner to store the values of the parameters and the reference
to the object with which the method is invoked.
(4) For all remaining non-inlined instructionsM[L],
AIIIM[L] = norm(AIIM[L])
(5) For all blocks of inlined code, we apply the weakest precondition function wp(M[L]) deﬁned in Table 3 to propagate
backwards the head assertion of the ﬁrst instruction following the block (which is the synchronisation assertion−→gs = −→ms). This in effect computes the weakest precondition of the whole block w.r.t. the synchronisation assertion).
Thus, if M[L] is an inlined instruction immediately following a potential (nonexceptional) post-security relevant
instruction or the ﬁrst instruction of a handler for a potential (exceptional) post-security relevant instruction,
AIIIM[L] = norm((g0 = r0) · . . . · (gn−1 = rn−1) · (gthis = rthis) · AIIM[L] ·wp(M[L]))
and otherwise,
AIIIM[L] = wp(M[L])
The fully annotated example program can be found in Appendix A.
Notice that inlined code blocks are cycle-free and do not contain jumps to any instruction outside of the block (other than
the one immediately following it), thus the backwardwp-propagation in rule (5) above is well-deﬁned. This is thanks to the
design of the ConSpec language. Extending the language to allow for (arbitrary) loops in update blocks, for instance, would
render this single-pass propagation insufﬁcient for obtaining weakest preconditions of the inlined blocks.
The correctness proof below relies on the following property of inlined code:
Property 7.1. Given a policyP , and a program T, let T ′ be the program inlined for the policy by an inliner as described above. Then
the following holds for each post-security relevant instruction M[L] of T ′: Let M[L] = invokevirtual (c.m) for some c and m,
α1, . . . ,αm be the guarded expressions gthis : c′i ∧ abρi → −→eE ρi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and α be ¬(gthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ gthis : c′p) → −→gs , induced
by the policy forM[L] as described in Section 6.2. Furthermore, let rthis be the local variable used by the inliner to record the reference
of the object M[L] operates on. Then the weakest pre-condition of the block of code inlined immediately after the instruction M[L]
in T ′ w.r.t. the synchronisation assertion −→gs = −→ms is the logical assertion∧
1≤i≤m rthis : c′i ∧ abρ′i → −→gs = −→eE ρ′i ∧ ¬(rthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ rthis : c′p) → −→gs = −→ms
The blocks inlined above and at the exception handlers of security relevant instructions are speciﬁed similarly.
The property essentially expresses that the ﬁnal postcondition of the inlined blocks can be pushed backwards to produce
preconditions that are discharged by the level II annotations. Note that this is the only point for which the full annotation
correctness proof relies on the actual code produced by the inliner. We refrain from giving a fully formalized proof that the
property actually holds for the inliner sketched above. The details, however, are not difﬁcult, and in Appendix A we give an
example in sufﬁcient detail that the reader should be able to convince herself that an inliner can be easily devised for which
the property holds. The critical point is that the update expressions contained in theweakest precondition of an inlined block
are required by the property to correspond to the update expressions of the corresponding event clause of the policy, up to
renaming. An inliner can achieve this by compiling ConSpec expressions using, for each arithmetic (resp. string) operation,
the corresponding instruction (resp. API method) of Java bytecode.
In the following result we use local validity to refer to logical validity of the veriﬁcation conditions resulting from a fully
annotated program (see Appendix B.4 and [8] for details).
Theorem 7.2. Suppose that I is an inliner satisfying Property 7.1. Let T be a program, and P a ConSpec policy. The fully annotated
inlined program I(T,P) is locally valid.
If the full annotation of I(T,P) is locally valid, then it is also valid in terms of Deﬁnition 6.1. Hence, by the above result, the
inlined program I(T,P) is also valid with respect to the level I annotation for policyP , and therefore, by Theorem 6.2, adheres
to the policy.
Corollary 7.3. (Correctness of Inlining) Let P be a ConSpec policy and P be a program. The inlined program I(T,P) adheres to the
policy.
As the example in Appendix A indicates it is not hard to complete level II annotations to a full annotation that is efﬁciently
checkable. This makes full annotations suitable for use as proofs for on-device checking of inlining correctness in a proof-
carrying code setting. The veriﬁcation conditions that arise when checking the local validity of these annotations are trivial
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for the uninlined parts of the code as the synchronisation annotation is the invariant in this case and annotations inside
inlined blocks can be discharged with syntactic manipulations and basic reasoning about the class hierarchy. The fully
annotated program of Appendix A illustrates this point. A proof-carrying code framework based on the results of this paper
that employs our inliner has been developed. Details on the framework, including information on a bytecode precondition
checker implementation to be used in this context, can be found in [12].
Another corollaryof Theorem7.2 is that for anyprogramTandpolicyP the inlinedprogram I(T,P) yields onlymethod-local
co-executions. This is so since programs that validate full annotations validate also level II annotations and thus Theorem 6.4
applies to inlined programs.
In contrast to the rest of the paper, the results that we have presented in this section apply to a particular inlining scheme.
Similar results can be obtained for other inlining schemes as long as the annotation completion can be adapted so that the
resulting full annotations capture the updates to the embeddedmonitor state and the resulting validity problem is decidable.
In this way, different inliners can be employed in a proof-carrying code setting.
8. Related work
In this section, we discuss different types of inlining and whether these can be handled by our annotation scheme. We
relate our approach to other works that propose methods to specify policy adherence and to other security frameworks
inspired by proof-carrying code.
Monitor inliners. Monitor inlining has been employed as a security enforcementmechanism in a number of application areas.
We account here the basic types of monitor inlining implementations (in terms of where the code is inlined) offered in the
context of language-based security. We focus on method calls as security relevant actions, although it is possible to monitor
many other events with existing tools such as PoET [16].
The inliners that input policies in the form of security automata can be categorized according to where they insert code
to perform the inquiry of whether the security relevant action is safe to perform in the current state and the update on the
security state. The inlining style of PoET and our tool creates code where security checks and updates are scattered in the
program: the code is inserted around the security relevantmethod call at the caller side. Analternative is to inline theprogram
by altering the methods of the untrusted program only through replacing potentially security relevant method invocation
instructions with calls to new methods added in the inlining process. Each such new method is dedicated to a particular
security relevant method and consists of code that performs the necessary security checks, the call to the method and the
corresponding update to the security state. Such a wrapping approach is taken in Naccio, one of the ﬁrst tools for monitor
inlining [18]. A rather clean way of implementingmonitoring is through centralizing, i.e. using a single dedicated component
that “implements” the whole policy. The interface of the component includes an evaluator method that takes information
about the security relevant method call (e.g. the name of the method and argument values) as argument, performs the
necessary operations. The original program code is then only altered by the insertion of calls to this method before (or
after) each security relevant method invocation. The inliner of Vanoverberghe and Piessens is an example of centralizing
inliners [37]. The Polymer system also practices centralized inliningwhere a policy is speciﬁed as a Java class but APImethod
bodies are altered in the course of the inlining [9].
We can handle all these different types of implementations, with the exception of those that rewrite the body of security
relevant methods. It is important to note however that in some cases the procedure described in Section 7 for annotation
completionneeds to be adapted. For instance, the evaluatormethodof the dedicated policy component in centralized inliners
is not annotated with the synchronisation assertion. Instead, it should be equipped with annotations that specify that the
checks and updates are performed according to the policy and the security relevant action indicated by the arguments, which
consist of the security relevant method name and the values of its arguments. As mentioned in Section 6.3, those inliners
that perform optimizations on inlined code based on a sequence of security relevant actions are not supported with our
scheme, since these destroy the “per-action update” principle. An example is the inliner of Martin et al. [31].
Monitor inlining can also be implemented through aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [25,19]. In such an approach, the
security policy is programmed as an aspect, which gets inserted into the program at the compilation stage (aspect weaving)
resulting in scattered or wrapped code. In [13], an example can be found for policy enforcement on a Java application where
the policy is programmed as an aspect in AspectJ [6], an AOP environment. In this manner the two concerns, development
and contract declaration, are elegantly separated. The Monitoring-Oriented Programming (MOP) framework of Chen and
Ros¸u [11], the Tracematches tool of Allan et al. [4] and the monitor inliner of Hamlen and Jones [21] employ AOP. We have
not carried out this study in the context of aspect-orientation as this makes compositional reasoning on the level of program
methods more difﬁcult.
There exist monitor inliners in literature which use other policy speciﬁcation languages such as temporal logics (e.g.
[14,10]), but we do not discuss these further here.
Specifying policy adherence. In [5], Alpern and Schneider propose a method for showing that a program satisﬁes a temporal
property by producing proof obligations on the global state space of the program, presented as a transition system. The
problem we address here can be seen as its restriction to safety properties. Coming up with proof obligations using their
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method becomes trivial in this case and amounts to asserting that the automaton for the property is in an accepting state
throughout the execution of the program. The state space of bytecode programs are prohibitively large, however, thus
making the method impractical in this setting. Another result closely related to ours is the recent work on type-based
monitor certiﬁcation by Hamlen et al. [22]. Their policies are attached to security relevant classes and restrict the sequences
of methods called on instances of these classes. Thus the focus is on “per-object” monitoring, as compared to the “per-
session” model we consider in our annotation scheme. Their programs are bytecode programs with typing annotations and
type correctly with respect to a security policy if they adhere to the policy. Thus, the authors reduce the problem of correct
inlining to that of type-checking, which is an efﬁcient, well-studied procedure. However, their results are restricted to one
particular inliner, whereas we give a characterization of a whole class of compositional inliners.
Model based certiﬁcation. Many techniques inspired by the PCC approach have been developed for the certiﬁcation of safe
mobile code. Inmodel-carrying code (MCC), introduced by Sekar et al. [36], the program is shipped together with a model of
its security relevant behavior instead of a proof of policy adherence. Policy adherence checking on the consumer side can be
based on thismodel and used to certify the program for any policy that the program adheres to, provided themodel is precise
enough. In this respect, their approach is more general than ours. However, an additional check is needed on the consumer
side to make sure that the model is faithful to the program. Since this may be a costly task due to the size of the model,
Sekar et al. employs an under-approximation of the program behavior as the model and suggests the policy captured by this
model to be enforced on the program at runtime bymonitoring. Therefore, a trustedmonitoring component on the consumer
side is needed inMCC. If themodel is precise and therefore has a small number of spuriousmisbehaviors, the runtime aborts
due to this enforcement are expected to occur infrequently. The main difﬁculty in applying MCC in practice is to develop a
suitable model extraction scheme, which is not a trivial problem. In [36], the authors suggest a method for learning ConSpec
automata-like models through executing the program on test cases. Albert et al. follow a similar approach but use abstract
interpretation to compute the models [3]. This computation involves repeated iterations of the same procedure to reach a
ﬁxpoint. A single execution of the procedure on the model is then enough to check on the consumer side that the model is a
faithful abstractionof theprogram.However, theclassofpolicieshandledby theapproachare restricted to theclassof stateless
ConSpec policies, hence it is not possible to use the approach for policies restricting the order of the security relevant actions.
9. Conclusion
This paper presents a speciﬁcation language for security policies in terms of security automata, and a two-level class ﬁle
annotation scheme in a Floyd-style program logic for Java bytecode, characterizing two key properties: (i) that the program
adheres to a given policy, and (ii) that the program has an embedded method-compositional monitor for this policy. The
annotation scheme thus characterizes awhole class of correctly inlined programs. As themain application of these resultswe
sketch a simple inlining algorithm and show how the two-level annotations can be completed to produce a fully annotated
program which is valid. This establishes the mediation property for inlined programs. Furthermore, validity can be checked
efﬁciently using a weakest precondition based annotation checker, thus preparing the ground for on-device checking of
policy adherence in a proof-carrying code setting. This idea has been developed within the European S3MS project.
The results of the paper are used to show mediation, namely that inlined monitors guarantee the properties they are
meant to enforce. Another desirable result, which we leave to future work, is to state the complementary "conservativity"
property: that the behavior of an inlined program is identical to the behavior of the original program, up until points of policy
violation in which case the inlined program terminates. Future effort will focus on generalizing the level II annotations by
formulating suitable state abstraction functions to extend the present approach to programs that are not inlined but still self-
monitoring. Another interesting challenge is to extend the annotation scheme of Section 6 to programswithmulti-threading
to develop a more comprehensive proof-carrying code setting. Current efforts focus on solving this problem.
Appendix
A. Full annotation example
The full annotations for the level II annotated method of Fig. 6 is shown in Fig. A.1. The synchronization assertion,
denoted by INV , is (ga, gp) = (SecState.accessed, SecState.permission). The pre- and post-conditions of the method are
the synchronization assertion:
Requires = Ensures = INV
The symbol  denotes the following multi-assignment expression:
((ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥) ∧ gthis : GUI ∧ s[0]) → (ga, true) |
((ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥) ∧ gthis : GUI ∧ ¬s[0]) → (ga, false) |
(¬(gthis : GUI)) → (ga, gp)
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Fig. A.1. A fully annotated application method for the example policy.
The reader may get detailed information about veriﬁcation conditions in the deﬁnition of local validity (def. B.7). In this
example, the inlined block in which we propagate the synchronisation annotation is L6–L12. The most involved veriﬁcation
condition arises from the condition EnsuresM ⇒ head(AIII[L6]):
INV ⇒ (gthis = r1) ∧ (r1 <: GUI ⇒ ( = ( SecState.accessed, s[0]))) ∧
(¬(r1 <: GUI) ⇒ ( = ( SecState.accessed, SecState.permission)))
Using the ﬁrst conjunct of head(AIII[L6]), we can replace gthis by r1 in . Notice that GUI does not have any subclasses in
this example, so r1 <: GUI ⇔ r1 : GUI.  updates permission to the value of s[0] if gthis is of type GUI and does not change it
otherwise.
Notice that what we do here is in some sense to unify  (the updates coming from the ghost annotations) to
head(AIII[L6]) (the effectual update of the inlined block), as we had also noted in Section 7. In any target program, EnsuresM
is the synchronisation annotation and  and the head of the weakest precondition of the inlined block looks similar.
What is left to the theorem prover is simply to match expressions in the annotations to those in the weakest
precondition.
Below are the details of the annotation completion.
Requires and Ensures are determined by rule 1
Requires = Ensures = INV
Annotations of L1–L2 are computed using rule 2.
AIII[L1] = norm(INV) = INV
AIII[L2] = norm(INV) = INV
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Annotation of L5 (used for computing the annotations L3–L4) is computed using rule 3.
AIII[L5] = norm((gthis := s[0]) ·
(gthis : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)) ·
((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, SecState.permission)) ·
(gthis = r1))
= ((s[0] : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)) ∧ INV ∧ (s[0] = r1)) ·
(gthis := s[0]) ·
((gthis : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)) ∧ INV ∧ (gthis = r1))
Annotations of L3–L4 are computed using rule 5 using wp computation.
AIII[L4] = wp(M[L4])
= (shift(head(AIIIM[L5])))[s[0]/r1]
= ((s[1] : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)) ∧ INV ∧ (s[1] = r1))[s[0]/r1]
= ((s[1] : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)) ∧ INV ∧ (s[1] = s[0]))
AIII[L3] = wp(M[L3]
= unshift((head(AIIIM[L + 1]))[s[1]/s[0]])
= unshift((s[1] : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)) ∧ INV ∧ (s[1] = s[1]))
= (s[0] : GUI ⇒ (ga, gp) /= (⊥,⊥)) ∧ INV ∧ (s[0] = s[0])
Annotation of L13 (used for computing the annotations of L6–L12) is computed using rule 4.
AIII[L13] = norm(INV) = INV
Annotations of L6–L12 are computed using rule 5 using wp computation.
AIII[L12] = wp(M[12])
= unshift(head(AIIIM[L13])[s[0]/r2])
= unshift(INV)
= INV
AIII[L11] = wp(M[11])
= (shift(head(AIIIM[L12])))[s[0]/ SecState.permission]
= INV [s[0]/ SecState.permission]
= (ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, s[0])
AIII[L10] = wp(M[10])
= unshift(head(AIIIM[L13])[r2/s[0]])
= unshift((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, r2))
= (ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, r2)
AIII[L9] = wp(M[9])
= (s[0] = 0 ⇒ shift(head(AIIIM[L12]))) ∧ (¬(s[0]) = 0 ⇒ shift(head(AIIIM[L10])))
= (s[0] = 0 ⇒ INV) ∧ (¬(s[0]) = 0 ⇒ (ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, r2))
AIII[L8] = wp(M[8])
= (s[0] <: GUI ⇒ (head(AIIIM[9]))[1/s[0]]) ∧
(¬(s[0] <: GUI) ⇒ (head(AIIIM[9]))[0/s[0]])
= (s[0] <: GUI ⇒ ((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, r2))) ∧
(¬(s[0] <: GUI) ⇒ (INV))
AIII[L7] = wp(M[L7])
= unshift((head(AIIIM[L8]))[r1/s[0]])= unshift((r1 <: GUI ⇒ ((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, r2))) ∧
(¬(r1 <: GUI) ⇒ (INV)))
= (r1 <: GUI ⇒ ((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, r2))) ∧
(¬(r1 <: GUI) ⇒ INV)
We denote with  below the right hand side of the ghost assignment of AIIM[L6].
AIII[L6] = norm(gthis = r1 · AIIM[L6] ·wp(M[L6]))= norm(gthis = r1 · AIIM[L6] ·
(shift(head(r1 <: GUI ⇒ ((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, r2))) ∧
(¬(r1 <: GUI) ⇒ INV)))[s[0]/r2])
= norm(gthis = r1 · (ga, gp) :=  ·
(r1 <: GUI ⇒ ((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, s[0])) ∧
(¬(r1 <: GUI) ⇒ INV))
= (gthis = r1) ∧ (r1 <: GUI ⇒ ( = ( SecState.accessed, s[0]))) ∧
(¬(r1 <: GUI) ⇒ ( = ( SecState.accessed, SecState.permission))) ·
((ga, gp) :=  ·
((r1 <: GUI ⇒ ((ga, gp) = ( SecState.accessed, s[0]))) ∧
(¬(r1 <: GUI) ⇒ INV)))
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B. Proofs
B.1. Proof of Theorem 5.3
Theorem 5.2 (Correctness of monitoring by co-execution). Let T be a program, and P a policy. The following holds, where A is
the action set of AP :
{w ↓ 1 | w is a co-execution of T and AP } = {E ∈ 	(T) | srtA(E) ∈ LAP }
Proof. (⊇) We prove that for all executions E of the program such that the security relevant trace of E is in the language of
the policy automaton, there is an execution w of the program and the policy automaton, where w ↓ 1 = E.
Let q0q1 . . . be the run of the automaton for srtA(E). We (1) construct a conﬁguration-automaton state pair sequence w
for E, using the automaton run and (2) prove that w is a co-execution with w ↓ 1 = E.
(1) Intuitively,we begin the constructionwith the initial conﬁguration C0 of E and the initial state q0.We add the following
conﬁgurations, paired with this state until a security relevant action (s.r.a.) is produced. Whenever an s.r.a. is produced, the
state component of the added pair is changed with the next automaton state in the run. This process is repeated until both
the end of the execution and of the automaton run is reached, for inﬁnite executions the process is repeated inﬁnitely many
times. Security relevant actions are detected by using the actA functions on consecutive conﬁgurations of the execution.
Formally, let wn denote the sequence constructed for the (ﬁnite) preﬁx C0 . . . Cn−1Cn of E. The sequence w0 is deﬁned as
(C0, q0) if act

(C0) =  and (C0, q0)(C0, q1) if act
(Cn) ∈ A
. When constructing the sequence wn for longer executions, we use
the current state as the state component of the last pair of wn−1, denoted below by qk . The sequence wn for n > 0 is deﬁned
as follows:
wn =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
wn−1 · (Cn, qk) if act(Cn−1,Cn)act
(Cn) = 
wn−1 · (Cn, qk) · (Cn, qk+1) if act(Cn−1,Cn)act
(Cn) ∈ A

wn−1 · (Cn, qk) · (Cn, qk+1) if act(Cn−1,Cn)act
(Cn) ∈ A
wn−1 · (Cn, qk) · (Cn, qk+1) · (Cn, qk+2) if act(Cn−1,Cn) ∈ A, act
(Cn) ∈ A

(2) We prove that wi is a co-execution and wi ↓ 1 = C0 . . .Ci for all ﬁnite preﬁxes C0 . . .Ci of E. The result then follows
since this is a continuous predicate on conﬁguration sequences with respect to the immediate preﬁx ordering and 	(T) is
preﬁx-closed.
In the proof, we use the fact that ConSpec automata are deterministic (by deﬁnition) and their language is preﬁx-closed
(since each ConSpec automaton is a security automaton as deﬁned by Schneider [35]). We can then conclude for each preﬁx
E′ of E that E′ is in the language of the automaton and the run of the automaton which accepts E′ is a preﬁx of the run
accepting E.
(Base Case) Consider the execution consisting of the initial conﬁgurationC0. If act

(C0) ∈ A
, then the security relevant trace
of C0 is act

(C0). Then w0 = (C0, q0)(C0, q1) by construction. This sequence is an interleaving since : (C0, q0) −→AUT (C0, q1).
By deﬁnition then, w0 ↓ 1 = C0 and extract(w0) = q0q1 act
(C0). Clearly extract(w0) ∈ E
. On the other hand, if act
(C0) = ,
the security relevant trace is empty. The accepting run then consists of q0 and the constructed sequencew0 of (C0, q0). Again
by deﬁnition, w0 ↓ 1 = C0, and extract(w0) = .
(Induction Hypothesis) Assume that wi is a co-execution and wi ↓ 1 = C0 . . .Ci for all i < n.
(Inductive Step) Consider the sequencewn constructed for the preﬁx C0 . . . Cn−1Cn using the automaton run q0 . . . qm where
m is the number of security relevant actions of C0 . . .Cn−1Cn. By deﬁnition, the following holds:
srtA(C0 . . .Cn−1Cn) = srtA(C0 . . .Cn−1) act(Cn−1,Cn) act
(Cn)
We consider the most difﬁcult case where act(Cn−1,Cn) ∈ A, act
(Cn) ∈ A
. (The other cases are similar) Since q0 . . . qm is
an accepting run for this execution:
δ(qm−2, act(Cn−1,Cn)) = qm−1 (i)
δ(qm−1, act
(Cn)) = qm (ii)
Then the sequencewn−1, constructed (asdescribedabove) forEn−1 using the runq0 . . . qm−2, is a co-executionby the induction
hypothesis. Note that the last component of this co-execution is Cn−1, qm−2 by the construction. Again by construction, the
sequence wn is an extension of wn−1 (last case):
wn = wn−1(Cn, qm−2)(Cn, qm−1)(Cn, qm)
We prove that:
• wn is an interleaving: The sequencewn−1 is an interleaving by the induction hypothesis. Since En is an execution, there
is a machine transition from Cn−1 to Cn. There are transitions between the consecutive states qm−2qm−1qm of the
automaton run. Thus the extension town−1 consists of onemachine transition followed by the automaton transitions:
(Cn−1, qm−2) −→JVM (Cn, qm−2) −→AUT (Cn, qm−1) −→AUT (Cn, qm) (*)
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• w is a co-execution: By assumption wn−1 is a co-execution. Then extract(wn−1) ∈ (E
 ∪ E)m−2 since there are m− 2
s.r.a’s in En−1. By deﬁnition of the extract function and using (*):
extract(wn) = extract(wn−1)actA(Cn−1,Cn) · qm−2qm−1qm−1qm · act
A(Cn)
By (i), act

A
(Cn−1,Cn)qm−2qm−1 ∈ E and by (ii), qm−1qmact
A(Cn) ∈ E
. Hence extract(wn) ∈ (E
 ∪ E)m.• w ↓ 1 = En: This simply follows from the induction hypothesis and applying the ﬁrst projection function to wn.
(⊆) We prove that for all co-executionsw of the program and the policy automaton, the projection to the ﬁrst component
is (i) an execution of the program and that (ii) its security relevant trace is in the language of the policy automaton.
(i) We prove this by induction on the length of w.
(Base Case) If w = (C, q), since w is an interleaving, C = C0 and q = q0. Then, w ↓ 1 = C0, which is an execution.
(Induction Hypothesis) We assume the statement for wn of length n.
(Inductive Case)We prove the statement forwn+1, wherewn+1 = wn • [(Cn+1, qn+1)] for some qn+1. Let the last element
of wn be (Cn, qn) and wn ↓ 1 = En. By the deﬁnition of ↓ 1 (page 5), En = E′ • [Cn] for some sequence of conﬁgurations
E′. Again by the deﬁnition of ↓ 1, wn+1 ↓ 1 = E′Cn • [Cn+1] if Cn −→JVM Cn+1 and wn+1 ↓ 1 = E′ • [Cn+1] otherwise.
(1) If the ﬁrst case applies, wn+1 ↓ 1 = (wn ↓ 1) • [Cn+1] and everything but the last element is an execution by the
induction hypothesis and the last two conﬁgurations are related with the JVM transition relation. Hence this is an
execution of T. We also note the observation here that	(T) is closed under the transitive closure of the sufﬁx relation
built using the JVM transition relation.
(2) If the second case applies, by the deﬁnition of interleaving, Cn+1 = Cn and therefore wn+1 ↓ 1 = wn ↓ 1. The result
follows from the inductive hypothesis.
(ii) We prove this also by induction on the length of w.
(Base Case) If w = (C, q), since w is an interleaving, C = C0 and q = q0. Then, w ↓ 1 = C0. According to the table of
page 5, srtA(C0) = a
 ∈ A
 for some pre-action a
, or srtA(C0) = . The statement trivially holds in the latter case, as  is
in the language of all security automata with at least one state. Let us assume the ﬁrst case. We will prove that such
a co-execution does not exist, thus reaching a contradiction and hence the statement will hold vacuously for the ﬁrst
case. By the deﬁnition of extract, extractw = a
 if the ﬁrst case applies. But by the deﬁnition of being a co-execution
a
 should be in the set (E
 ∪ E)*∪ (E
 ∪ E)ω . This is not possible as there is no string of length 1 in this set. Hence we
reach a contradiction.
(Induction Hypothesis) We assume the statement for all wi of length i, where i < n+ 1.
(Inductive Case) We prove the statement forwn+1. We have to consider the cases of how a co-execution is produced by
extending another co-execution. We prove the statement for wn+1, where wn+1 = wn • [(Cn+1, qn+1)] for some qn+1.
Notice that since both are co-executions, the function extract maps both to the same set. It cannot be however that
extractwn+1 = extractwn • E′ for some E
 or E, for these extensions contain always three elements, two automata states
and an action, and therefore cannot be extracted when the co-execution is extended with only one pair. This means
that the security relevant trace of En+1 is the same with that of En and the result holds by induction hypothesis. The
other cases are proved similarly. 
B.2. Proof of Theorem 6.2
The proof of this theorem is quite complicated as it brings together many concepts of the paper such as the symbolic and
the ConSpec automaton, co-execution, and operational semantics of annotations.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the level I annotated program is valid. Intuitively, our goal is to show that any execution of the
program can be “completed” with automaton states to form a co-execution of the program with the policy automaton (the
ConSpec automaton for the policy). This means for each conﬁguration in the execution such an automaton state should be
found that the pair sequence that is formed is a co-execution. We use the value of the ghost state as the automaton state.
Remember the conditions for a conﬁguration-automaton state pair sequence to be a co-execution. The ﬁrst condition is that
the automaton component of the ﬁrst pair is the initial automaton state. When execution begins, the ghost state is the initial
state, thus satisﬁes this condition. The second is that for a pre-action, the automaton state is updated sometime before the
action takes place, but after the previous action in the series. The ghost state is updated immediately before the execution
of a pre-action, since a ghost assignment is placed before each instruction which may yield a preaction when executed.
(Similarly for post-actions but with an update to automaton state/ghost state immediately after.) We call a co-execution
where the monitor updates are done immediately before (or after) a s.r.a. a closest updating co-execution. For the ghost state
to be a monitor for the program, it should also be updated to the correct automaton state. We prove this using the way a
ConSpec automaton is induced by a symbolic automaton and the way the (same) symbolic automaton induces the level I
annotations. There is one catch: if at some conﬁguration of the execution, the ghost state is undeﬁned and a security relevant
action is performed, the ghost state remains undeﬁned; but such a sequence can never be co-execution. The reason is that
the “undeﬁned” state of the automaton does not have any outgoing transitions, thus the automaton sequence extracted from
such a pair sequence would not be a run of the automaton. The validity assumption is used to rule out this possibility. So we
also show in the course of the proof that if the annotated program is valid, then a security relevant action is not executed
when the ghost state is undeﬁned.
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We ﬁrst present some new deﬁnitions that will be used in the course of the proof like extended execution and closest
updating co-execution.
Preliminaries. In the text below, the program T annotated with level I annotations for policy P is TP . Furthermore, pc(C)
denotes the value of the program counter and M(C) the method at the top frame of conﬁguration C. Finally, σ(−→gs ) denotes
the value of the ghost state given at the environment σ .
The following property follows from the deﬁnition of level I annotations.
Property B.1. Let C be an unexceptional conﬁguration of program T. If A


M[pc(C)] =  in TP , then act
A(C) = . Let C ′ be conﬁgu-
ration following C in an execution of program T. If C ′ is unexceptional and AM[pc(C)] =  in TP , then actA(C,C ′) = .
Deﬁnition B.2 (Extended execution). Given an annotated program TA, a sequence of extended conﬁgurations
(ψ0,C0, σ0,0)(ψ1,C1, σ1,1) . . . is termed an extended execution of TA, if:
• (ψ0,C0, σ0,0) is the initial extended conﬁguration as deﬁned on page 6.1, and
• ∀i. * (ψi,Ci, σi,i) → (ψi+1,Ci+1, σi+1,i+1)
That is, any *-derivation that Deﬁnition 6.1 refers to is an extended execution.
The projection of an extended execution to its second component isolates the execution of the JVM program, and is
described similar to the deﬁnition of the ﬁrst projection function in Section 5. An extended execution is called complete if it
executes the precondition (if any) of the instruction at the program counter of its last conﬁguration to completion.
Deﬁnition B.3 (Complete extended execution). Given a ﬁnite execution E = C0 . . .Cn−1Cn of program T, the extended execution
XE = (ψ0,C ′0, σ0,0) . . . (ψm−1,C ′m−1, σm−1,m−1)(ψm,C ′m, σm,m−1) of the annotated program TP is the complete extended
execution of E if XE ↓ 2 = E and ψm = .
Given a ﬁnite execution En = C0 . . .Cn of program T, notice that the following hold for the execution En+1 = C0 . . .CnCn+1,
where (,Cn, σ ,) is the last element of XEn :
(1) If Cn is not an application method call or a return, and Cn+1 is not exceptional, i.e. rule (5) of Table 2 applies:
XEn+1 = XEn • (AM(Cn+1)[pc(Cn+1)],Cn+1, σ ,) . . . (,Cn+1, σ ′,) (B.1)
for some σ ′.
(2) If Cn is a return or is exceptional with an exception that cannot be handled in the current method, i.e. rule (6) applies:
XEn+1 = XEn • (Ensures(*(M(Cn))),Cn+1, σg unionmulti σ ′l ,′) . . . (,Cn+1, σ ′,′) (B.2)
where σ = σg unionmulti σl for some σg and σl and  = σ ′l′.
(3) If Cn is an application method call and Cn+1 is not exceptional, i.e. rule (7) applies:
XEn+1 = XEn • Requires(*(M(Cn+1))) · AM(Cn+1)[1],Cn+1, σg unionmulti σ0l , σl · ) . . . (,Cn+1, σ ′, σl · ) (B.3)
where σ = σg unionmulti σl for some σg and σl .
(4) Finally, if Cn was not exceptional but Cn is exceptional, i.e. rule (8) applies:
XEn+1 = XEn • (,Cn+1, σ ,) (B.4)
Constructing the co-execution. Asequenceof conﬁguration-automaton statepairs are constructed fromasequenceof extended
conﬁgurations using the function subw. This function forms a sequence by sampling themachine conﬁguration and the ghost
state whenever one of the two is updated. If the machine conﬁguration changes in consecutive extended conﬁgurations, the
sequence is extendedwith themachine conﬁguration and the ghost state of this second If the current extended conﬁguration
is the last in the sequence, then the sequence is not extended further. If a conﬁguration induces a preaction, the annotated
programTP updates theghost state immediatelybefore transiting to thenext conﬁguration (that is “executing themethod”). If
two consecutive conﬁgurations induce a non-exceptional postaction, the ghost state is updated immediately after transiting
to the second conﬁguration (that is upon return). However, in the case of an exceptional postaction the update is not
immediate. When two consecutive conﬁgurations C and C ′ induce an exceptional action, the new state cannot be obtained
by sampling the ghost state some time during the extended execution that ends with C ′. The reason is that there is no
annotation associated with exceptional conﬁgurations and the ghost update is done in this case at the precondition of the
ﬁrst instruction of the handler. This precondition is executed after at the extended execution of the conﬁguration following
C ′. In order to sample the ghost value in such a situation, we consider a maximal execution of which the ﬁnite execution is a
preﬁx of. This way we get to “peek” to the new value of the ghost state.
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Let E = C0 . . .Cj−1Cj be a ﬁnite execution and let XE = (ψ0,C ′0, σ0,0) . . . (ψk ,C ′k , σk ,k) be its corresponding extended
execution. Notice that the ﬁrst extended conﬁguration correspond to the execution of RequiresI〈main〉. If the last two conﬁgura-
tions (Cj−1, Cj) of E do not induce an exceptional action, the sequence of conﬁguration-automaton state pairs corresponding
to this extended execution is deﬁned as
w(XE) = (C0, q0) subw((ψ1,C ′1, σ1,1) . . . (ψk ,C ′k , σk ,k))
where q0 is the initial state of AP and subw is deﬁned below. If Cj−1 and Cj induce an exceptional action, we extract the
co-execution using the complete extended execution X ′ of E′ = C0 . . .CjCj+1. The value of the ghost state at the last element
of X ′ is taken in this case.
• subw((ψ1,C1, σ1,1) · (ψ2,C2, σ2,2) · X ′) = (C2, σ2(−→gs )) · subw((ψ2,C2, σ2,2) · X ′) if C1 −→JVM C2
• subw((ψ1,C1, σ1,1) · (ψ2,C2, σ2,2) · X ′) = (C2, σ2(−→gs )) · subw((ψ2,C2, σ2,2) · X ′) ifψ1 = (−→gs := α1| . . . |αk) · ψ2 for some
k /= 1
• subw((ψ1,C1, σ1,1) · (ψ2,C2, σ2,2) · X ′) = subw((ψ2,C2, σ2,2) · X ′) otherwise.
• subw(ψ ,C, σ ,) = 
In the deﬁnition above, the update of the ghost state causes a sampling only if the update is not done by the last condition
of the conditional update. The reason is that for a level I annotated program, an update on the ghost state using the last
condition of the conditional expression is a stutter.
Deﬁnition 5.1 captures all interleavings of the monitor and the program, for a monitor that updates the security state
every time a s.r.a. occurs. If a conﬁguration induces a preaction, the update should happen before the transition to the
next conﬁguration. If two consecutive conﬁgurations induce a postaction, the update should be done after the transition
to the latter conﬁguration. The deﬁnition aims to specify the interval where the update may be done for the interleaving
to be a co-execution. A co-execution is a closest updating co-execution if the monitor makes a corresponding transition at
the latest possible point when the update is for a preaction and at the earliest possible point when the update is for a
postaction.
Deﬁnition B.4 (Closest Updating Co-execution). A co-execution is closest updating co-execution if the following holds for
consecutive pairs (C1, q1) (C2, q2) (C3, q3) (C4, q4):
• act

A
(C1) ∈ A
 ∧ (C2, q2) −→JVM (C3, q3) ⇒ (C1, q1) −→AUT (C2, q2)
• act
A
(C1,C2) ∈ A ∧ ¬Exc(C2) ⇒ (C2, q2) −→AUT (C3, q3)
• act
A
(C1,C2) ∈ A ∧ Handled(C2) ⇒ (C2, q2) −→JVM (C3, q3) ∧ (C3, q3) −→AUT (C4, q4) .
The proof. We now prove that, the conﬁguration-automaton state pairs extracted from a level I annotated program is a
co-execution, provided that the annotations are valid and vice versa. What is more, due to the shape of the annotations, we
prove that these co-executions are closest updating.
Lemma B.5. TP is valid, if and only if, for every maximal execution E of T, the extracted sequence w(XE) of the complete extended
execution XE of TP is closest updating and w(XE) ↓ 1 = E.
Proof. There are two aspects to the proof. First, we are showing that ghost assignments follow security relevant method
executions and are performed according to theway described in the policy. Second, that no security relevant action execution
happens when the ghost state is undeﬁned if and only if the annotated program is valid.
We proceed by induction on the length of E.
(Base Case)When the number of conﬁgurations in E is 1, the complete extended execution is the execution of RequiresI〈main〉
and the precondition of the ﬁrst instruction of 〈main〉. The more involved case arises if this precondition is not empty.
Otherwise,w(C0) = (C0, q0)by construction. Similarly, ifAI〈main〉[1] includes a ghost assignment then the constructed sequence
depends on which condition the assignment was done for. Let us consider the case when k /= 1. In this case, the constructed
sequence is w(C0) = (C0, q0)(C0, σ0(−→gs )), where σ0 is the mapping at the end of the extended execution. By deﬁnition, this
is a co-execution if act


〈main〉(C0) ∈ A
 and δ
(q0, act
〈main〉(C0)) = σ0(−→gs ). This can be proven using the deﬁnition of before
annotations and the way ConSpec automaton is extracted from symbolic automaton.
(Induction Hypothesis) For all executions Ei = C0 . . .Ci−2Ci−1 of length i such that i ≤ n and actA(Ci−2,Ci−1) is not an
exceptional post action, we assume that w(Xi) is a co-execution where w(Xi) ↓ 1 = Ei if and only if all boolean formulae
asserted in the complete extended execution Xi holds except possibly the assertions Deﬁned
 and Deﬁnede asserted in the
course of the execution of the precondition of pc(Ci−1).
Notice that this induction hypothesis is sufﬁcient, since nomaximal execution can end with an exceptional conﬁguration
that is immediately preceded by an exceptionally security relevant API method call. Similarly, for no maximal execution
Deﬁned or Deﬁnede is asserted in the course of the execution of the precondition of pc(Ci−1). If the maximal execution is one
which returns from the 〈main〉, then pc(Ci−1) is return and hence no deﬁnedness precondition. If the maximal execution is
one which ends exceptionally, then this exception is not one thrown by a security relevant API method.
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(Inductive Step) Consider the execution En+1 = C0 . . .Cn−1Cn of T and its corresponding extended execution XEn+1 .
We consider the different forms of the pair Cn−1,Cn:
• Cn−1 and Cn are both not exceptional, and Cn−1 is not an application method call:
We have assumed that the statement holds for En = C0 . . .Cn−1. Since XEn+1 is an extension of XEn , the assertions met
in XEn+1 hold if and only if assertions met in XEn and X hold where XEn+1 = XEn · X . By the induction assumption, the
assertions met in XEn of TP hold if and only if w(XEn ) is a co-execution and w(XEn ) ↓ 1 = En.
Let the last element of XEn be (,Cn−1, σ ,) for some σ and , executing method of Cn be M and pc(Cn) be L. Notice
that since Cn−1 is not exceptional, L is not a handler instruction. By the deﬁnition of a complete extended execution,
the ﬁrst element of the sufﬁx X is (AM[L],Cn, σ ,), and its last element is (,Cn, σ ′,) for some σ ′ that is determined by
the assignments in AM[L]. That is X corresponds to the execution of the annotation sequence that is associated with L
inM: AM[L]. By the deﬁnition of subw and w:
w(XEn+1 ) = w(XEn )(Cn, σ(−→gs )) · subw(X)
By the deﬁnition of level I annotations,
AM[L] = AeM[L − 1][1] · AM[L − 1][1] · A
M[L] · AM[L][0] · AeM[L][0]
In the rest of the argument of this case, we take AeM[L − 1][1] =  for simplicity. This annotation otherwise would set
gpc to 0, which does not change the argument.
Notice that, again by the deﬁnition of level I annotations,AM[L] contains atmost two assignments to the ghost state in
this case. (For all L′, AM[L′][1] and A
M[L′] can contain at most one ghost assignment (to the ghost state), while AM[L′][0],
AeM[L′][0] and AeM[L′ − 1][1] cannot contain any.) In order to go through all shapes the sufﬁx subw(X) can have, we
consider the possible ghost assignments in X:
· AM[L − 1][1] = , A
M[L] = 
In this case therearenoghostassignments inAM[L]andso subw(X) =  bydeﬁnition.Then,w(XEn+1 ) = w(XEn )(Cn, σ(−→gs )).
From this and the induction hypothesis, the following can be concluded: (i) w(XEn+1 )) ↓ 1 = En+1 by the deﬁnition
of ↓, (ii) w(XEn+1 ) is an interleaving, since the last element of w(XEn ) is (Cn−1, σ(−→gs )) and Cn−1 −→JVM Cn.
By the deﬁnition of the extract function:
extract(w(XEn+1 )) = extract(w(XEn ))actA(Cn−1,Cn)act
A(Cn)
By Property B.1, act


A
(Cn) =  and actA(Cn−1,Cn) = . By the induction hypothesis, w(XEn+1 ) is a co-execution.
Assume thatw(XEn+1 ) is a closest updating co-execution. The only way this is possible is thatw(XEn ) is itself a closest
updating co-execution, and act


A
(Cn) = , actA(Cn−1,Cn) = . (Otherwise there would be ghost updates executed in
w(XEn+1 ))). The latter we have already shown to hold. By the induction hypothesis, if w(XEn ) is a c.u. co-execution
then all assertions (except possibly the deﬁnedness assertionsDeﬁned andDeﬁnede executed for pc(Cn−1)) hold. Since
A


M[L] = , there is no Deﬁned
 that is asserted in the precondition of pc(Cn−1), hence the only assertions that should
be shown to hold are Deﬁned and Deﬁnede of pc(Cn−1). If pc(Cn−1) is not a method invocation instruction, there is
no deﬁnedness assertions in its precondition, and we are done. If pc(Cn−1) is a method invocation instruction, either
Cn−1 is either an application method call or an API method call. In the former case, both Deﬁned and Deﬁnede hold
vacuously since the premise of the boolean formula does not hold, that is the object that the method is invoked on is
not one of those mentioned in these assertions.
Let us consider the case where Cn−1 is an API method call. Since there are no jumps to instructions after method
calls, pc(Cn−1) should be L − 1. By the deﬁnition of AFTER annotations, AM[L − 1][1] =  implies that AM[L − 1][0] = ,
so there is noDeﬁned for pc(Cn−1). If it is also the case that AeM[L − 1][0] = , we are done. If there is aDeﬁnede however,
we have to show that this also holds.
Suppose that Deﬁnede which comes from AeM[L − 1][0] does not hold. Then an alternative execution of the program
can be constructed by replacing Cn with C
′
n where C
′
n is exceptional. Since L − 1 is exceptionally security relevant
(otherwise there would be no Deﬁnede asserted for Cn−1), there is a handler H for L − 1. Now consider the alternative
execution that is achieved by extending the execution with C ′
n+1 where pc(Cn−1) = H and E′ = C0 . . .Cn−1C ′nC ′n+1. Then
w(XE′ ) cannot be a co-execution. We reach a contradiction.
· AM[L − 1][1] /= , A
M[L] = 
Then the sufﬁx X is as follows:
((−→gs := ce) · AM[L][0] · AeM[L][0],Cn, σ ,) (1)
→* ((−→gs := α1| · · · · · |αk) · AM[L][0] · AeM[L][0],Cn, σ ,) (2)
→ (AM[L][0] · AeM[L][0],Cn, σ ′,) (3)→* (,Cn, σ ′′,) (4)
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By deﬁnition, subw(X) =  if k = 1 and subw(X) = (Cn, σ ′(−→gs )) otherwise. Notice that σ ′′(−→gs ) = σ ′(−→gs ) since there are
no assignments to the ghost state in the steps between (3) and (4) and furthermore if k = 1, σ ′(−→gs ) = σ(−→gs ), by the
deﬁnition of level I annotations.
By the deﬁnition of AFTER annotations, A

M[L − 1][1] /=  if M[L − 1] = invokevirtual (c.m) for some class c and
method m. That is the instruction at above the current program counter is a method invocation instruction. By the
assumption that there are no direct jumps to instructions immediately belowmethod calls, the previous conﬁguration
is either a method call (to an API method) or a method return (from an application method).
(⇐) This direction is similar to the argument for the case above.
(⇒) As is apparent from the execution of X , subw(X) is determined by the value of k above:
(1) k = 1:
This corresponds to the case where we have a stuttering if the ghost state is deﬁned when the assignment
begins executing. This type of stuttering is meant to occur when the current call is not to a security relevant
action, in order to not to update the state unnecessarily with this assignment. This last condition can be
satisﬁed also if the ghost state is not deﬁned when the assignment begins executing. In this case, for the
extracted sequence to be a co-execution, the method return should not be a postaction.
By the deﬁnition of subw, subw(X) =  and w(XEn+1 ) is the same as case 1 above. The argument that this is
an interleaving and that its ﬁrst projection is En is also identical. The equation B.2 also holds. For w(XEn+1 )
to be a co-execution then, we should show that no security relevant actions are induced by the addition of
conﬁguration Cn to the execution En−1. By Property B.1, act


A
(Cn) = . If Cn−1 is a return from an application
method, act

A
(Cn−1,Cn) = . The case where Cn−1 is a method call to an API is more complicated. This case
is to prove that, although this instruction has been annotated, in this case the method called as a result of
virtual method resolution turned out not to be security relevant.
Let Cn−1 be ((M, L − 1, s · d · s′, lv) · R,h
) and Cn be ((M, L, v · s′, lv) · R,h) for some actual arguments s, some
location d, some stack s′ and return value v. Notice that there exists a class c′ such that c′ deﬁnes type(h
, d).m
and type(h
, d) <: c. (If this was not the case, Cn would be exceptional.) Now suppose (v, c′,m, s,h
,h) is a
postaction of the induced automaton AP . Then there should exist, for some names x, x1, . . . , xn, a symbolic
postaction a

s = (τx, c′,m, ((τ1 x1), . . . , (τn xn))) of As such that the type of v is τ , the type of s[0] is τ1 etc. It
would then be the case that type(h
, d) ∈ RS((c,m),As \ Aes ), by the deﬁnition of RS. Notice that σ(gthis) = d by
the execution of A[L − 1][0] in XEn−1 .
Since k = 1, either ¬(gthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ gthis : c′p) or −→gs =
−→⊥ or both of them holds at (2) where RS((c,m),
A

s \ Aes ) = {c′1, . . . , c′p}. If only the ﬁrst holds, at (2), d is not an object of one of these classes, type(h
, d) ∈
RS((c,m),A

s \ Aes ). (We assume that type(h
, d) = type(h, d), that is an API call does not change the type of
the object it is called on)We reach a contradiction, showing that act

A
(Cn−1,Cn) = . Hence, extract(w(XEn+1 ))
is a co-execution. If both holds, then the return is again not security relevant and extract(w(XEn+1 )) is a
co-execution.
If only the second holds however act

A
(Cn−1,Cn) ∈ A and extract(w(XEn+1 )) cannot be a co-execution since
there is no outgoing transitions from the undeﬁned state in a ConSpec automaton induced from the symbolic
automaton of the policy. In order to rule out this case, we should prove that σ(−→gs ) /= ⊥. Now we use the
assumption that all assertions inXEn+1 holds. This is only the case if all assertions ofXEn holds. By thedeﬁnition
of AFTER annotations, A[L − 1][0] asserts that if gthis is of a class which is amember of RS((c,m),As \ Aes , then
σ(−→gs ) /= ⊥. Hence it cannot be the case only the second conjunct holds.
(2) k > 1:
Let σ(−→gs ) = q and σ ′(−→gs ) = q′, by the deﬁnition of subw and of extract:
w(XEn+1 ) = w(XEn )(Cn, q)(Cn, q′)
extract(w(XEn+1 )) = extract(w(XEn ))actA(Cn−1,Cn)qq′act
A(Cn)
In order to show that w(XEn+1 ) is an interleaving, we should prove that there exists an action a ∈ A
such that δ(q, a) = q′. From this, it will also follow that w(XEn+1 ) ↓ 1 = En+1. To prove that w(XEn+1 ) is a co-
execution, however, we should prove a stronger statement, namely that δ(q, act

A
(Cn−1,Cn)) = q′. (This is the
only possibility since by Property B.1, act


A
(Cn) = .)
This is the case when one of the conditions (other than the last condition) of the conditional assignment
is satisﬁed and the ghost state is set accordingly. We show that this is the case only if Cn−1 is a return from a
post security relevant method call and that the ghost state is set correctly.
Since k > 1, in the execution segment above, α1 has the following form: (
−→gs /= −→⊥ ) ∧ gthis : c′i ∧ a → −→e ,
where c′
i
∈ RS((c,m),As \ Aes ). Note that α1 holds at (2). This implies that −→gs /= −→⊥ at σ .
We ﬁrst show that Cn cannot be a return from an applicationmethod. (If this was the case the returnwould
be from an application method, hence not security relevant). Assume that this is the case, let this method
which is returning be c′,m and the object it was called on be d. (That is, the second frame in the activation
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stack of Cn−1 is (M, L − 1, s · d · s′) for some actual arguments s, and some stack s′) Since the call was made
by the instruction invokevirtual c.m, it should be the case that c′ deﬁnes (type(d,h),m)where h is the heap
at the time of the method call. Notice that gthis = d, since it was set to this value by A[L − 1][0] just before
the method call was made and since it is local so it is not changed during the execution of the application
method. (We further assume that the application method does not change the type of the object it is called
on) This means that c′ ∈ RS((c,m),As \ Aes ), which cannot be the case since it is an applicationmethod. Hence
we reach a contradiction, showing that Cn cannot be a return from an application method.
The only possibility left is that Cn is a return from an API method. Let Cn−1 be ((M, L − 1, s · d · s′, lv) · R,h
)
and Cn be ((M, L, v · s′, lv) · R,h) for some actual arguments s, some location d, some stack s′, return value
v and heaps h
,h. Let (c.m) : (γ → τ). Since α1 is a part of the ghost assignment, the symbolic automaton
should include the action a

s = (τ x, c′i ,m, ((τ1 x1), . . . , (τ|γ | x|γ |))) for some names x, x1, . . . and types τ , τ1, . . .
such that the type of v is τ , the type of s[0] is τ1 etc.What is more there exists a predicate b and an expression
tuple E such that (a

s , b, E) ∈ δs and a = abρ where ab is the boolean formula for predicate b and−→eE as deﬁned
in Section 6.2. The substitution ρ = [v/x, g0/x0, . . . , gk−1/xn−1, gthis/this] by this construction. Notice that
σ(gthis) = d by the execution of A[L − 1][0] in XEn−1 and hence c′i deﬁnes type(h
, d).m. Thus (v, c′,m, s,h
,h)
is a postaction of the induced automaton AP . We have proven that act

A
(Cn−1,Cn) ∈ A.
We are left to prove that δ(q, act

A
(Cn−1,Cn)) = q′. Since α1 holds at (2),
‖ abρ ‖ (Cn, σ) = true ⇔‖ b ‖ qIh
h = true
where I = [x → v, x1 → s[0], . . . ]. Using the same interpretation,
‖ −→eE ρ ‖ (Cn, σ) = q′ ⇔‖ E(si) ‖ qIh
h = q′(si)
for all security state variables si of
−→gs . The result then follows from the way a ConSpec automaton is induced
by a symbolic automaton.
(3) k = 0:
Let σ(−→gs ) = q and σ ′(−→gs ) = q′, by the deﬁnition of subw and of extract:
w(XEn+1 ) = w(XEn )(Cn, q)(Cn, q′)
extract(w(XEn+1 )) = extract(w(XEn ))actA(Cn−1,Cn)qq′act
A(Cn)
In order to show thatw(XEn+1 ) is an interleaving, we should prove that there exits an action a ∈ A such that
δ(q, a) = q′. From this, it will also follow that w(XEn+1 ) ↓ 1 = En+1. To prove that w(XEn+1 ) is a co-execution,
however, we should prove a stronger statement, namely that δ(q, act

A
(Cn−1,Cn)) = q′. (This is the only
possibility since by Property B.1, act


A
(Cn) = ).
It is possible to show in this case that Cn is a return from a security relevant method call by a similar
argument. The idea is that if Cn was a return from an application method call, the last condition of the
conditional assignment would instead have been satisﬁed, hence k would have been 1. Since this is not
the case, we know that Cn is a return from an API call. What is more, let this method be c
′.m. Then c′ ∈
RS((c,m),A

s \ Aes . Notice that none of the conditions in the assignment hold, that is k = 0, if either σ(−→gs ) = ⊥
or σ(−→gs ) /= ⊥ but the guards are not satisﬁed. In both cases, after this assignment the ghost state is undeﬁned:
σ ′(−→gs ) = ⊥.
The case that k = 0 may only occur if the ghost state becomes undeﬁned since the return from the API
methodwasaviolation. Since the last conditiondoesnothold,weknowthat theghost statewasnotundeﬁned
at σ andweknow that the object themethodwas called is of one of the classes inRS((c,m),A

s \ Aes . Thismeans
that the call is security relevant. Since none of the conditions before the last was satisﬁed, this is a violating
postaction. By the deﬁnition of the way a ConSpec automaton is extracted from a symbolic automaton, any
such state has a transition to the undeﬁned state. Hence δ(q, act

A
(Cn−1,Cn)) = q′, where q′ = −→⊥ and we are
done.
Hence, w(XEn+1 ) is a co-execution.
· The caseswhereAM[L − 1][1] = ,A
M[L] /=  andwhereAM[L − 1][1] /= ,A
M[L] /=  are proved similar to the case above.• Cn−1 and Cn are both not exceptional, and Cn−1 is an application method call: This case is similar to the one above
when Cn−1 is not an application method call.
• Cn−1 is exceptional, while Cn is not exceptional: The only interesting subcase of this case is when Cn−2 is an APImethod
call and act

A
(Cn−2,Cn−1) /= . In this case, notice that w(XEn+1 ) is not an extension of w(XEn ), but rather of w(XEn−1 ), by
the deﬁnition of w function.
• Cn−1 is not exceptional, while Cn is exceptional: The only interesting subcase of this case is when Cn−2 is an APImethod
call and act

A
(Cn−2,Cn−1) /= . Then the special constructiondescribed forw(X)whenX has an exceptional conﬁguration
as last element and the element before the last is an API call is used. 
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Proposition B.6. Given a program T and a policy P , if for every execution E of T there exists a co-execution w of T and AP
such that w ↓ 1 = E, then the sequence w(XE) extracted from the extended execution XE corresponding to this execution is also a
co-execution such that w(XE) ↓ 1 = E and w(XE) is closest updating.
Proof. For each co-execution, a closest updating co-execution can be constructed by postponing the transition of themonitor
for a preaction until the conﬁguration which calls this security relevant method is reached and by performing the transition
of the monitor right after the return of the security method call if the update is for a postaction. 
Theorem 6.2 (Level I Characterization) The level I annotated program T for policy P is valid, if and only if, T adheres to P .
Proof
The result follows in one direction from Theorem 5.3, proposition B.6 and lemma B.5; the other direction follows from
lemma B.5 and Theorem 5.3. 
B.3. Proof of Theorem 6.4
Theorem 6.4 The level II annotated program Twith embedded state−→ms is valid if and only if for each execution E of T, the sequence
w(E,−→ms) is a method-local co-execution.
Proof. (Sketch) The idea of the proof is to sample pre- and post-actions from E, immediately preceded and followed by a
sample of the embedded state −→ms. The sequence extracted in this way is almost a potential derivation, but in the case of a
postaction followed, some time later, by a preaction, an intermediate automaton statemay bemissing. It is not clear, however,
how to sample this state. Also, it is necessary to ensure that embedded state updates do not cross method boundaries. To
this end, extracted sequences need to be completed by (a) missing intermediate automaton states, and (b) indicators of
method boundary crossings at: method invocations that are not security relevant actions, return instructions, exceptional
conﬁgurations with an unhandled exception, and at the ﬁrst instruction of each method.
First,wenote that the embedded state−→ms is equal to the ghost state−→gs at sampling points if and only if the synchronisation
assertions added at level II hold. We show in the proof of Theorem 6.2 that the ghost state and machine conﬁgurations
constitute a co-execution if and only if level I annotated program is valid. If the level II annotated program is valid then the
sampling of the embedded stated as described above amounts to taking the co-execution of the ghost state and the program
and “skipping” some ghost updates, which the embedded state does not follow (as the sampling of the embedded state is
not done as frequently). Then extractII applied to this sequence falls in the set stated in Deﬁnition 6.3.
(⇐) In this direction, we show the result by taking any execution E of a valid level II annotated program. Since level II
annotations include level I annotations, by Theorem B.5 one can construct a co-execution of this program and the automaton
AP , in the sense of Section 5, using the ghost state. By the placement of the synchronisation annotations, the value of the
embedded state can be inferred at sampling points, using the value of the ghost state. Then, it is left to show that for the
embedded state to be a monitor for the policy, it is sufﬁcient that the embedded state is in synch with the ghost state at the
points where level II annotations are asserted. For instance, the ghost state gets updated for a preaction, immediately before
the action and by the validity of the level II annotations, at this point the embedded state is equal to the ghost state, hence
if the embedded state has been a monitor until this point, this property will be preserved for the next action.
The proof is by induction on the length of the execution:
(Base Case:) The sequence produced for an execution C0 depends on whether it is a sampling point or not. C0 is not
preceded by any conﬁguration, and is not exceptional. Therefore, if pc(C0) is an invokevirtual or a return C0 is a sampling
point and the sequence is w(C0,
−→ms) = (C0, q) where q = C0(−→ms). Otherwise, w(C0,−→ms) = (C0, q0). Let us carry out the case
when this is a return. By the synchronisation annotation asserted by the Ensures clause of 〈main〉, −→ms = −→gs at C0. Since there
are no ghost assignments associated with a return instruction, the ghost state is still the initial state of the automaton at C0.
The result of applying the extract function is then extractII(w) = q0brkq0.
(Induction Hypothesis:) For all executions Ek of length k ≤ n, if the level II annotation of T with embedded state−→ms is valid,
then w(Ek ,
−→ms) is a method-local co-execution.
(Inductive Step:) Assume that the level II annotation of T with embedded state −→ms is valid and consider the execution
En+1 = C0 . . .Cn. The sequencew(C0 . . .Cn,−→ms) is built by extendingw(En,−→ms)with the pair (Cn, q). Notice that sincew(En,−→ms)
is a method-local co-execution, the result of applying the extractII function returns a sequence ending with some state q,
except the case where Cn−1 is an API method call that induces a preaction. If Cn is a sampling point, the state component q
of this pair is Cn(
−→ms); the state component is the same as the state component of the last pair of w(C0 . . .Cn−1,−→ms), if Cn is
not a sampling point. By lemma B.5, we know thatw(XEn ) is a closest updating co-execution andw(XEn ) ↓ 1 = En. Let the last
element of XEn be ,Cn, σ , for some σ and .
We consider the different cases for the pair Cn−1,Cn. Notice that for all cases except the last, Cn is a sampling point.
• Cn is an API method call and Cn−1 is not a method call: By the deﬁnition of extractII,
extractII(w(En,
−→ms)) = extractII(w(C0 . . .Cn−1,−→ms)) Cn(−→ms)act
(Cn)
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By the validity assumption and the way level II annotations are inserted, Cn(
−→ms) = σ(−→gs ).
• Unhandled(Cn): invokevirtual instruction or if n = 0.
• Cn is not of the above: In this case, Cn is not a sampling point. Furthermore, by the deﬁnition of extractII: hence
extractII(w(En,
−→ms)) = extractII(w(En−1, −→ms)) and the claim holds by the induction hypothesis.
• The other cases are similar.
(⇒) The argument goes as follows: we take an arbitrary method-local co-execution and show that any execution that yields
such a co-execution validates its assertions. For instance, as a base case, take qbrkq. By deﬁnition of extractII, the sequence
that yields this co-execution includes one and only one conﬁgurationwhich is an applicationmethod call. There are no other
methodcalls (if thiswas thecase the resultingco-executionwouldcontainmoreautomatonstates.). Since the samplingbegins
with the initial automaton state q0, q should be q0. There are no s.r.a’s and the ghost state is also the initial state throughout
the execution, thus validating both the assertions on the ghost state being deﬁned (if any) and the synchronisation assertion
immediately before the method call. (Notice that there are no other assertions as there are no other states extracted and
hence has no other sampling points.) 
B.4. Proof of Theorem 7.2
Before we proceed with the proof of the theorem, we clarify our notion of local validity.
For a fully annotated program, checking validity can be reduced to the simpler problem of checking local validity by
referring to the axiomatic semantics of instructions. Local validity can be checked by generating veriﬁcation conditions for
each instruction and formethod entry and exit points, by using the corresponding pre- andpost-conditions and checking that
these veriﬁcation conditions hold. As mentioned before, our logic is an adaptation of the logic of Bannwart and Müller [7,8],
which in turn is a specialization of the logic of Poetzsch-Heffter andMüller [32] to bytecode. In this section,we ﬁrst introduce
this logic brieﬂy, noting the differences it has with the one presented in Section 6.1. Then we deﬁne a notion of local validity,
the correctness of which is based on the results of Bannwart and Müller. In this way, the deﬁnition of local validity is clear
and can be used in the proof of the theorem.
Bannwart–Müller logic. The logic is for a bytecode language with object-oriented features such as classes and objects, in-
heritance, ﬁelds, and virtual method resolution, as well as unstructured control ﬂow with conditional and unconditional
jumps, which makes it suitable for our purposes. Instead of using triples for instruction speciﬁcations as in classic Hoare
logic, programs are annotated by associating a single assertion with each instruction, interpreted as its precondition. For
an instruction I, its precondition has to be established by all predecessors of I, which usually includes the instruction that
precedes I in theprogramtext aswell as all instructions that jumpto I.Wealso followthis approach for specifying instructions.
Bannwart and Müller allow different speciﬁcations to be attached to the method implementation and the method body.
What is more, it is possible to pose a common pre- and post-condition to all methods that can be invoked using the same
method invocation instruction. Properties of methods are expressed by Hoare triples of the form {P} comp {Q }, where P and
Q are ﬁrst-order formulae and comp is a method body, a method implementation, or a “virtual” method, explained in more
detail below. The triple {P} comp {Q } expresses the following reﬁned partial correctness property: if the execution of comp
starts in a state satisfying P, then (1) this computation terminates in a state inwhich Q holds, or (2) comp aborts due to errors
beyond the semantics of the programming language (for instance, internal JVM errors), or (3) comp does not terminate.
In both our logic and this logic, individual instruction speciﬁcations can be combined at the level of method bodies. This
is due to the following guarantees on the structure of Java bytecode: the instruction sequence constituting a method body
is always entered at the ﬁrst instruction and left after the last instruction5 and all jumps are local within a method body.
The body of the method c.m is denoted with body(c.m). A method body speciﬁcation is then written as {P} body(c.m) {Q },
where the precondition P is the precondition of the ﬁrst instruction and the postconditionQ is the precondition of the return
instruction. Method implementation speciﬁcations play a similar role to that of Requires and Ensures in our logic, except that
the postcondition of a method implementation need not hold at an exceptional exit from the method. These are denoted
with {P} imp(c.m) {Q } for method c.m.
The proofs are constructed in this logic using rules that combine speciﬁcations on a lower level to infer speciﬁcations
on a higher level and language independent rules. Here we only present a few rules from the version of this logic where
exceptions not considered (i.e. [8]) in order to give an intuition to the user. The details of the logic, including reasoning on
programs that contain exception handling can be found in [7]. A sequent in this proof system has the following form:
  {P} comp {Q }
where  is a set of method speciﬁcations needed for dealing with recursive methods. The rule about method body speciﬁ-
cations, which combines the assertions occurring in the method body as explained above is as follows:
5 Note that methods in which return instructions occur earlier can be rewritten so to redirect all returns to the last return instruction in order to satisfy
this condition.
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∀i ∈ {|body(c.m)|}. (  {A[i]} Li : Ii)
  {A[1]} body(c.m) {A[|body(c.m)|]}
To infer the method implementation speciﬁcations, the following rule is used:
, {P} imp(c.m) {Q }  {P ∧ r0 /= null} body(c.m) {Q }
  {P} imp(c.m) {Q }
The assertion r0 /= null guarantees that, at the point where the method body starts executing, the address to the object
the method is called on is stored in the local variable r0 and that it is not null. The rule also shows how assertions such as
{P} imp(c.m) {Q } are added to the set of assumptions.
Speciﬁcations on virtual methods are meant to capture method speciﬁcations imposed by the speciﬁcation of an
invokevirtual instruction on any method that can be called as a result of the execution of this instruction. In order to
prove the precondition P for the instruction invokevirtual c.m, it has to be proven that (i) {P′}virtual(c.m){Q ′}, i.e. the
methods that can be called by this instruction satisfy their method speciﬁcation, (ii) that P implies the precondition P′ of the
virtualmethod speciﬁcation, with actual arguments substituted for the formal parameters, and that (iii) the postconditionQ ′
of the method speciﬁcation implies the precondition of the instruction following invokevirtual. In turn, to be able to prove
{P} virtual(c.m) {Q }, it has to be proven that the speciﬁcation holds for each method that can be called. This is done through
proving {P ∧ r0 : c′} imp(c′.m) {Q } for the implementation of each method c′.mwhere c′ <: c and where the assertion r0 : c′
guarantees that the method is called on an object of type c′.
Our method speciﬁcations and the related rules are simpliﬁcations of this logic. While Bannwart–Müller logic is both
sound and complete [7] with respect to the language presented above, we only aim at soundness for program speciﬁcations
of a particular shape, speciﬁcally for speciﬁcations described in detail in sections 6.2, 6.3 and 7. Here we only note that
when the program is fully annotated in our scheme, all methods (with the exception of 〈main〉 which is not to be called from
inside the program) have the same speciﬁcation. Furthermore, both method speciﬁcations (the pre- and post-condition of
methods) and the pre- and post-condition ofmethod invocation instructionsmention the same (invariant) assertion. Finally,
this invariant does not mention formal arguments. Our Requires and Ensures clauses correspond to method implementation
pre- andpost-conditions of Bannwart–Müller logic, respectively. Notice thatmethodbody speciﬁcations donot correspond to
our Requires and Ensures clauses, as amethod body pre-condition is asserted each time there is a jump to the ﬁrst instruction
fromwithin the body, since it is identical to the precondition of the ﬁrst instruction. Therefore the rules of Bannwart–Müller
logic become superﬂuous. Our only extension to this logic is the use of ghost variables and ghost assignments. Ghost variables
canbe seen as regular variableswhich arenot affectedbyprogramcode.We treat ghost assignments the samewayasprogram
instructions as these are not boolean expressions.
Local validity. In Section 7, we described how a program inlined for a policy with a simple inliner can be fully annotated
so that the validity of the annotations implies adherence of the program to the policy. Consequently, the problem of policy
adherence for an inlined program is reduced to checking local validity. In this section, we introduce a suitable notion of fully
annotated programs and conditions for a fully annotated program to be locally valid.
A fully annotated program is, then, a program where a sequence of annotations γ are associated with each instruction
and with the Requires clause, and where only a single assertion is associated with the Ensures clause; each instruction
speciﬁcation and Requires clause consists of a single boolean expression or an alternating sequence of ghost assignments
and boolean expressions α, with the ﬁrst and last elements being a boolean expression. This deﬁnition guarantees that each
ghost assignment is preceded and succeeded by a boolean expression. The expression before a ghost assignment can then
be used as its speciﬁcation, like it is done for program instructions.
In the deﬁnition of local validity, we use the function wp(M[L]) for computing the local weakest precondition of an
instruction presented for a subset of JVM instructions in Table 3. The notion of local validity is deﬁned as expected, namely
that (i) themethodprecondition implies the annotationassociatedwith theﬁrst instruction, (ii) thepreconditionof the return
instruction implies the method post-condition, (iii) the pre-condition of an instruction implies the weakest precondition
of the instruction provided it is not a method invocation, (iv) the last assertion before a ghost assignment implies the ﬁrst
assertion after the ghost assignment where the ghost values are replaced with the conditional expression of the assignment,
(v) the pre-condition of an instruction implies the pre-condition of any handler that covers the instruction and it implies
the post-condition of the method if it can raise an exception not covered by any handler of the method, (vi) for all method
invocation instructions L, there exists an assertion α such that the pre-condition of the instruction implies the conjunction
of the pre-condition of any method, which can be called by the instruction and α, while the conjunction of α and the post-
condition of any method, which can be called by the instruction, imply the pre-condition of L + 1, furthermore if a method
that canbe calledby this instruction raises exceptions, then thepost-conditionof the calledmethod implies thepre-condition
of the corresponding handler if any, or implies the postcondition of the caller method, (vii) ﬁnally, the initializations to the
static variables done by the initial static heap is sufﬁcient to make the pre-condition of 〈main〉 valid.
In the deﬁnition below, the function head returns the ﬁrst element of an annotation sequence and last, the last element.
StaticsT denotes the set of static variables c.f of T and for all c.f ∈ StaticsT, vc.f is equal to shT0 (c.f ). We let |= denote standard
ﬁrst-order logic validity.
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Deﬁnition B.7 (Local Validity). A fully annotated program T is locally valid if for every virtual method M = (P,H,A,Requires,
Ensures) the following holds:
(i) |= last(Requires) ⇒ head(A[1]),
(ii) |= last(A[|P|]) ⇒ Ensures,
(iii) for all L ∈ Dom(P) whereM[L] is not a method invocation instruction: |= last(A[L]) ⇒ wp(M[L]),
(iv) whenever γ · α · (−→g := ce) · α′ · γ ′ is an instruction speciﬁcation:
|= α ⇒ α′[ce/−→g ]
(v) for all L ∈ Dom(P), ifM[L] can raise an exception with type c, one of the following holds:
a) There exists a handler (L1, L2, L
′, c′) that handles this exception, and
|= last(A[L]) ⇒ head(A[L′])
b) There does not exist a handler for label L and exception c, and
|= last(A[L]) ⇒ Ensures
(vi) for a label L ∈ Dom(P)whereM[L] = invokevirtual c.m , and for all methods c′.m that can be invoked as a result of the
execution of this instruction and virtual method resolution, let c′.m = (P′,H′,A′,Requires′, Ensures′) and c′.m be of arity
n. Then there exists the assertion α which mentions only local and (local) ghost variables, such that:
· |= last(A[L]) ⇒ (head(Requires′) ∧ α),
· |= α ∧ Ensures′ ⇒ head(A[L + 1]),
· If c′.m raises an exception then either there exists a handler with destination L′ and |= Ensures′ ⇒ head(A[L′]) or
there is no such handler and |= Ensures′ ⇒ Ensures.
(vii) |=
∧
c.f∈StaticsT
c.f = vc.f ⇒ head(Requires〈main〉)
The assertion α mentioned in item (vi) is used for assertions that are preserved by themethod call, that is assertions on local
program and ghost variables. Note that this notion of local validity includes recursive methods, since we do not require that
the called method be a different method from the caller method. This, in effect, means that the method speciﬁcation can be
assumed at the point of the recursive call, which is in line with [8].
Showing that a locally valid program is valid also in the sense of Deﬁnition 6.1 can be done based on the soundness
result6 of [8], detailed and extended to exceptions in [7]. Such a proof consists of extending Bannwart–Müller logic with a
rule for ghost assignments, extending the soundness proof they present with this rule and showing that a proof tree can be
constructed to infer {RequiresM}imp(M){EnsuresM} for each methodM of the program in this logic. The proof construction is
straightforward as our local validity deﬁnition is simply an application of the proof rules in a restricted setting. A rule for
handling ghost variables is not hard to develop either, guided by the fact that ghost assignments are very much like ordinary
assignment statements that do not alter the machine conﬁguration, and would resemble rule (iv) above.
The proof
Theorem 7.2 Suppose that I is an inliner satisfying property 7.1. Let T be a program, and P a ConSpec policy. The fully annotated
inlined program I(T,P) is locally valid.
Proof. (Sketch) We show that the veriﬁcation conditions resulting from the full annotation of I(T,P) are valid and efﬁciently
checkable. To simplify the presentation, we consider here post-actions only; the argument is easily adapted to pre-actions
and exception actions.
Notice that for fully annotated programs, every instruction is annotated by a non-empty sequence of logical assertions al-
ternatingwith ghost variable assignments, always starting andendingwith a logical assertion.Notice also that Ensures(*(M))
and Exsures(*(M)) are all equal to the synchronization assertion −→gs = −→ms for fully annotated programs. The ﬁrst and last
elements of the annotation sequence of Requires(*(M)) is also the synchronization assertion (except for 〈main〉, in which
case last(Requires(*(M))) is again −→gs = −→ms). Similarly, notice that for all instructions L, where L is not the label of an inlined
instruction and is not a security relevant action, last(AIIIM [L]) is the synchronization assertion.
We assume that the return instruction is not the ﬁrst instruction of an exception handler, the last element in its annotation
sequence is the synchronisation annotation. We also assume that the inlined instructions do not raise exceptions.
Then, a full annotation of I(T,P) gives rise to a set of veriﬁcation conditions described as follows.
6 Their soundness result states that whenever  {P}body(c.m){Q }, it is the case that for all initial conﬁgurations C that c.m can start running with (i.e.
conﬁgurations with the right number of values for arguments are on the stack etc.) and all conﬁgurations C ′ , if C ′ is a terminating conﬁguration with the
current method c.m, C is related to C ′ with the reﬂexive, transitive closure of the transition relation of the operational semantics and P holds at C, then Q
holds at C ′ . In order to prove this result, they prove a similar result for single steps of the machine.
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First, there are three types of veriﬁcation conditions arising from method compositionality, namely:
• last(Requires(*(M))) ⇒ head(AIIIM [1]),
• last(AIIIM [R]) ⇒ Ensures(*(M)),
• For all instructions L that is not a method call and that can raise an unhandled exception last(AIIIM [L]) ⇒ Ensures(*(M))
where R is the label of the return instruction in method M, and where last is a function on sequences returning the last
element. The inlined instructions are assumed not to raise any exceptions, so no veriﬁcation condition for exception raising
is generated by these. Additionally, only inlined instructions and method calls change the embedded monitor state, hence
the simple form of the veriﬁcation conditions of the latter type. In the ﬁrst two cases and in the last case when L is not the
label of a method call, the antecedent and the consequent are (syntactically) equal to the synchronisation assertion. These
veriﬁcation conditions are therefore valid, and validity is efﬁciently checkable.
Second, every ghost variable assignment−→g := ce gives rise to a veriﬁcation condition. If α · (−→g := ce) · α′ is a subsequence
of AIIIM [L] for some Lwhere α and α′ are logical assertions, then α ⇒ α′[ce/−→g ] is a veriﬁcation condition. Due to the normaliza-
tion performed in the annotation completion, α must contain a conjunct α′[ce/−→g ]. Such veriﬁcation conditions are therefore
valid, validity being efﬁciently checkable.
Third, every non-method-call instruction M[L] gives rise to a veriﬁcation condition last(AIIIM [L]) ⇒ wp(M[L]). There are
three cases to be considered: (a) ifM[L] is a non-inlined instruction with non-inlined successor instructions only, last(AIIIM [L])
is syntactically equal to wp(M[L]) by construction; (b) ifM[L] is a non-inlined instruction followed by an inlined instruction
(in the case of post-actions only, the latter indicates the beginning of an inlined block serving to record the current values
of the parameters and the object with which the following potentially security relevant instruction is called), then the
synchronization assertion−→gs = −→msmust appear as a conjunct in both last(AIIIM [L]) andwp(M[L]), and the only other conjuncts
in the latter must be either of the shape Deﬁned or s[i] = s[i]; (c) ifM[L] is an inlined instruction, last(AIIIM [L]) must contain a
conjunct wp(M[L]) by construction. In all three cases, the veriﬁcation condition is valid, validity being efﬁciently checkable;
the only interesting case here is presented by Deﬁned, the consequent −→gs /= −→⊥ of which is implied by −→gs = −→ms. Similarly,
every non-method call instruction M[L] that can raise an exception which is handled by the handler at label H gives rise
to the veriﬁcation condition last(AIIIM [L]) ⇒ head(AIIIM [H]). By the assumption that the inlined instructions do not raise an
exception, this instruction cannot be an inlined instruction. There are two cases to consider: (a) if M[H] is a non-inlined
instruction, then both the antecedent and the consequent are the synchronisation annotation; (b) if the handler M[H] is an
inlined instruction (which is possible only if it is the ﬁrst instruction a code inlined for a potentially preaction occurring
in the original handler) this case becomes a subcase of the proof for pre-actions, handled similar to the ﬁnal part of this
proof.
Finally, every method-call instructionM[L] calling some methodM′ gives rise to three types of veriﬁcation conditions. If
the method call is not potentially post-security relevant, these are:
• last(AIIIM [L]) ⇒ Requires(*(M′)),
• Ensures(*(M′)) ⇒ head(AIIIM [L + 1]), and
• For all handler instructions H of L, Ensures(*(M′)) ⇒ head(AIIIM [H])
In the ﬁrst two formulas, the antecedent and the consequent are (syntactically) equal by construction, and hence valid.
The last set of veriﬁcation conditions are valid and efﬁciently checkable by the argument for the case when M[L] is not a
method-call presented above where last(AIIIM [L]) should be replaced by Ensures(*(M′)).
IfM[L] is calling some methodM′ which is potentially security relevant, the three types of veriﬁcation conditions are
• last(AIIIM [L]) ⇒ Requires(*(M′)) ∧ φ,
• Ensures(*(M′)) ∧ φ ⇒ head(AIIIM [L + 1]), and
• For all instruction handler instructions H of L, Ensures(*(M′)) ∧ φ ⇒ head(AIIIM [H]) where φ is the formula (g0 = r0) ∧· · · ∧ (gn−1 = rn−1) ∧ (gthis = rthis).
Notice that the invokedmethod does not change the local variables and the evaluation stack of the caller method (except
for popping arguments from the stack and pushing its return value). Then a formula mentioning variables not changed by
the invoked method (such as φ) can be added to both the pre-and postconditions of the invoked method [8].
The ﬁrst of these conditions is again easy to show valid, since Requires(*(M′)) and all conjuncts in φ also appear as
conjuncts in last(AIIIM [L]) by construction. The third set of veriﬁcation conditions are similar to the last cases of the argument
above, whenM[L] is calling a non-potentially security relevant action. The only really involved case in the whole proof is the
second veriﬁcation condition.
Let α1, . . . ,αm be the guarded expressions gthis : c′i ∧ abρi → −→eE ρi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and α be¬(gthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ gthis : c′p) → −→gs ,
all induced by the policy for the instructionM[L] = invokevirtual (c.m) as described in Section 6.2 (cf. After Annotations).
Then the second element of AIIIM [L + 1] must be a ghost assignment −→gs := ce where ce is the conditional expression α1 |· · · | αm | α. The block inlined immediately after the (potentially post-security relevant) instruction M[L] has the important
property that its weakest pre-condition w.r.t. the head assertion of the ﬁrst instruction following the block (which is the
synchronisation assertion −→gs = −→ms) is the logical assertion
∧
1≤i≤m rthis : c′i ∧ abρ′i → −→gs = −→eE ρ′i ∧ ¬(rthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ rthis : c′p) → −→gs = −→ms
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where the substitution ρ′
i
is deﬁned as [s[0]/x, r0/x0, . . . , rn−1/xn−1, rthis/this,−→ms/−→gs ] if r = (τ x) and as [r0/x0, . . . , rn−1/xn−1,
rthis/this,
−→ms/−→gs ] if r = void. Therefore, head(AIIIM [L + 1]) must be the logical assertion
φ
∧ Deﬁned
∧ ∧1≤i≤m rthis : c′i ∧ abρ′i → ce = −→eE ρ′i∧ ¬(rthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ rthis : c′p) → ce = −→ms
where φ is as explained above, and where ce is the tuple of conditional expressions −→cei, obtained from ce by replacing each
expression vector−→eE occurring in cewith its i-th component. Now, validity of the veriﬁcation condition Ensures(*(M′)) ∧ φ ⇒
head(AIIIM [L + 1]) is established as follows. The ﬁrst conjunct φ (actually a set of conjuncts) of head(AIIIM [L + 1]) appears as a
conjunct in Ensures(*(M′)) ∧ φ. The second conjunct Deﬁned is implied by Ensures(*(M′)) ∧ φ because Ensures(*(M′)) is−→gs = −→ms,which implies−→gs /= −→⊥ . Everyconjunct rthis : c′i ∧ abρ′i → ce = −→eE ρ′i is validunder theequalitiesofEnsures(*(M′)) ∧
φ, since then every guard rthis : c′i ∧ abρ′i matches exactly the guard of αi, and −→eE ρi is equal to −→eE ρ′i . Validity can thus be
easily checkedmechanically by simple equational reasoning and (syntactic) guard matching. Finally, validity of the conjunct
¬(rthis : c′1 ∨ · · · ∨ rthis : c′p) → ce = −→ms is established similarly.
WhenM[L] can give rise to an exceptional postaction, the last set of veriﬁcation conditions look slightly different. Notice
that our inliner inserts a handler for each such potentially security relevant instruction that handles all types of exceptions.
Let the label of the ﬁrst instruction of this handler to be H for the instructionM[L], then the three veriﬁcation conditions are:
• last(AIIIM [L]) ⇒ Requires(*(M′)) ∧ φ ∧ (gpc = L) and
• Ensures(*(M′)) ∧ φ ∧ (gpc = L) ⇒ head(AIIIM [L + 1]), and
• Ensures(*(M′)) ∧ φ ∧ (gpc = L) ⇒ head(AIIIM [H])
where φ is the formula (g0 = r0) ∧ · · · ∧ (gn−1 = rn−1) ∧ (gthis = rthis). The non-trivial case is then to show that the third
veriﬁcation condition is valid and efﬁciently checkable. This argument is similar to the argument made above for the non-
exceptional case. 
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